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KILLING THE NEW BUFFALO: STATE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DEFENSE TO
ENFORCEMENT OF IGRA INDIAN
GAMING COMPACTS
SIDNEY M. WOLF*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians' ruled that Indian tribes have exclusive
authority to control gaming on their reservations. 2 The Cabazon
decision ensured tribes freedom from state interference with
gaming enterprises run on Indian lands.3 The following year,
Congress responded to Cabazon by enacting the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA).4 States and Nevada gaming interests
were the principle proponents.' IGRA not only imposed federal
limitations on the ability of tribes to regulate reservation-based
* Assistant Professor, Law and Public Policy, Department of Landscape
Architecture and Regional Planning, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
B.G.S., 1972, M.A., Urban and Regional Planning, 1974, J.D. 1975, University
of Iowa, Ph.D., Public Policy Analysis, 1972, University of Illinois.
1. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
2. In the Cabazon decision the Court found that when state laws permitted
but civilly regulated gaming activities on non-Indian lands, tribes could permit
those same activities and regulate them under tribal law. Only if a state
criminally prohibited such gaming would that prohibition extend to the res-
ervation. Because the distinction between civil regulation and criminal prohi-
bition was not always clear, the Court noted that "the shorthand test is
whether the conduct at issue violates the State's public policy." Id. 480 U.S.
at 209-10. See infra part IV.C for a discussion of the Cabazon case.
3. S. Rkr'. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3071, 3072-73 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 4461.
4. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§[ 2701-2721 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)).
5. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 33 (statement of Sen. McCain).
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gambling, but also gave states substantial influence over the
most coveted type of gaming, high-stakes and casino-style gam-
bling on Indian lands.6 Tribes opposed this statute which cripples
the "new buffalo. ' 7
IGRA divides gaming into Class I, Class II, and Class III
categories.' Class I consists of traditional Indian games and is
subject solely to tribal regulation.9 Class II consists of mostly
bingo-type games, and while there are minimal federal conditions
on such gaming, it too is not subject to state regulation. 10 Class
III gaming consists of sophisticated and high-stakes gaming such
as slot machines, blackjack, lotteries, parimutuel wagering, rou-
lette and other casino-type games.1' Class III gaming is the only
category subject to state influence.
IGRA requires the states and tribes to enter into "compacts"
before Class III gaming can be conducted on Indian lands. 2 A
compact is the result of negotiations between the states and
tribes as to the proper operation and regulation of Class III
gaming. 3 States must negotiate compacts at the request of a
tribe.' 4 If a state falls to negotiate properly, the tribe can sue
the state in federal courts.'
6. See infra part III.B (detailing states' power to regulate some types of
gaming through the compact requirement).
7. Robert Dvorchak, Without Wampum, Indians Bank on Blackjack,
L.A. TimEs, Jan. 3, 1993, at A10. Indian gaming can be likened to the buffalo
because of its ability to sustain the tribes. See infra notes 37-39 and accom-
panying text.
8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6),(7),(8) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
9. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Class
I gaming.
10. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Class
II gaming.
11. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Class
III gaming.
12. 25 U.S.C.§ 2710(d)(1)(C). The compact must also be approved by the
Secretary of Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3)(B). See generally infra part III.B
(describing compacting).
IGRA was not the first attempt at federal legislation to use tribal-state
compacts to resolve conflicts between states and tribes. In 1978, the Senate
passed the Tribal-State Compact Act, to encourage Indian tribes and states
to shift from litigation to negotiation to solve their disputes. S. 2502, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The bill never became law.
13. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). Congress noted that a compact might require
extension of state controls to gaming activities on Indian lands. See supra
note 12 (explaining previous attempts to legislate in this area).
14. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
15. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(D)(7)(A). IGRA grants jurisdiction to federal district
courts to hear suits by Indian tribes arising from the failure of a state to
enter into compact negotiations or conduct the negotiations in good faith.
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). Federal district courts are also granted jurisdiction over any
other cause of action initiated by a state or Indian tribe to enjoin Class III
gaming. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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As economic entities competing with the tribes, states have
adopted a two-phase strategy to stymie Indian gaming opera-
tions. Initially, states delay or refuse to negotiate compacts with
the Indians,' 6 Without this state-tribal compact, it appears that
IGRA prohibits the tribes from operating casino gaming.' 7 When
tribes sue to compel states to negotiate, states assert that the
constitutional defense of sovereign immunity, under the Eleventh
Amendment, bars such suits.'8 The United States Courts of
Appeal have split on whether state immunity bars suits to compel
IGRA compacting, with the majority ruling in favor of the
tribes.' 9
IGRA and states' tactics put tribes in a Catch-22. Tribes
cannot operate casinos on Indian land without a state-tribal
compact. States, however, refuse to negotiate, 20 and the federal
courts have split on whether the Eleventh Amendment bars suits
to compel state negotiation.2 1 IGRA leaves the Indians without
a remedy and thereby kills casino gaming - the new buffalo.
One of the prime movers behind IGRA, then House Interior
Committee Chairman Morris Udall, described the compact pro-
vision as a "delicately balanced compromise.'' 22 The legislative
16. Mark A. Jarboe, Regulating Indian Gaming: Fairness or Finagling?,
Tan BENcH AND BAR OF MINN., May-June 1993, at 26.
17. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 6 (IGRA "does not contemplate
and does not provide for the conduct of Class III gaming activities on Indian
lands in the absence of a tribal-state compact.").
18. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S.CoNlST. amend. XI.
The states have also challenged the constitutionality of the compacting
process under the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
The states allege that IGRA coerces them to compact and as such infringes
upon the powers of state sovereignty protected under the Tenth Amendment.
Courts reject this claim because IGRA only requires states to negotiate in
good faith. See Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432-
36 (10th Cir. 1994); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d
273, 279 (8th Cir. 1993).
19. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d 1422 (finding states not immune from suits to
enforce IGRA); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991 (9th
Cir. 1994) (same); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (lth
Cir. 1994) (holding states immune from suits by tribes); Cheyenne River Sioux,
3 F.3d 273 (holding that IGRA abrogates state sovereign immunity). See also
infra part VII (discussing IGRA litigation).
20. Jarboe, supra note 16, at 26.
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. 134 CONG. REc. 25,377 (1988) (statement of Rep. Udall).
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history of IGRA reflects congressional concern for both tribes
and states as sovereign entities and their "significant govern-
mental interests" in gaming on Indian lands 23 The committee
report for IGRA concluded that the compacts between tribes24
and states25 were the best mechanism to address the interests of
both sovereigns with respect to regulation of casino gaming and
other high-stakes gaming enterprises. 26
In adopting the compacting provision, Congress proceeded on
the stated assumption that states and tribes should share the
mutual benefits of class III gaming.27 The committee believed
equity required that the tribes and states negotiate these bene-
fits. 28 The committee report warned that the compact require-
ment for Class III gaming should not be used by a state to
exclude Indian tribes from gaming or to protect state-licensed
gaming enterprises from competition with Indian tribes. 29
This admonition proved prophetic. States have leveraged the
compact requirement for the very purpose its opponents decried.
Some states have successfully excluded Indians from the benefits
of Class III gaming.
IGRA was a compromise Indian tribes did not savor, but was
one they accepted as part of a deal.30 The states then broke the
deal, using the Eleventh Amendment to kill the compact ar-
rangement. A lawyer representing the Indian tribes noted the
"deja-vu." 3 1 He recalled previous "Indian-giving" such as the
Black Hills which were given to the Dakota Indians and then
taken away after gold was discovered. 2
23. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 13.
24. Id. The Committee report on IGRA mentioned that the state govern-
mental interests with respect to class III gaming on Indian lands consisted of
the interplay of this type of gaming with state public policy, safety, law and
other interests, including economic interests, in raising revenues for state
citizens. Id. The chief public safety concern raised by the states in advocating
a federal framework like IGRA, and one which is explicitly recognized in the
statute's statement of purpose, was to shield the Indian gaming from infiltra-
tion from organized crime. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2).
25. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 13. The Committee report on IGRA
declared that tribal government interests included raising revenue to provide
governmental services for the benefit of the tribal community and reservation
residents, promoting public safety as well as law and order on tribal lands,
achieving the objectives of economic self-sufficiency and Indian self-determi-
nation, and regulating activities of persons on tribal lands. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Jarboe, supra note 16, at 26.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. The Black Hills were originally left to the Dakota Indians in thehttps://openscholars ip.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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This Article examines and proposes a solution to the strategies
states employ to harness the Indian tribes' new buffalo - casino
gaming. Part II uncovers states' hidden agenda in the fierce
competition for casino gaming proceeds. Part III details IGRA's
provisions, with particular attention to the compact process.
Part IV analyzes the pre-IGRA law governing gaming on Indian
lands. Part V describes the legislative development of IGRA
with special emphasis on the compact requirement. Part VI
focuses on state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Part VII analyzes federal case law on IGRA abrogation.
Part VIII concludes that while the states have no constitutional
authority to resist compacting, the impasse created by differing
judicial interpretations will likely continue until Congress or the
courts act to resolve it.
II. COMPETrIVE REAL TY OF GAMNG: STATES V. INDLANS
The states and Indians are direct competitors, not mutual
beneficiaries, for gaming revenues. As economic competitors,
the states' motivation is to betray the compromise they agreed
to in IGRA's compact requirement.
Indian gaming revenues rose from $225 million in 1987, 33 the
year Cabazon was decided, to $6 billion by 1993,' 4 indicating
the rapid development of Indian gaming since the enactment of
IGRA. Over 200 tribes engage in some form of garhing business 35
and at least 74 tribes in 18 states have entered into compacts
with states to engage in casino gaming. 36 In sum, Indian gaming
activity exploded following IGRA.
Good reasons cause Indian tribes to engage in gaming. Gaming
operations offer tribes a better life which Congress summed up
19th century as a reservation because they were a wasteland considered of
little value to white settlers. When gold was discovered there, the federal
government reneged on the treaty and took back the Black Hills from the
Dakotas. Id.
33. Paul Lieberman, Lady Luck Turns on Indians, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6,
1991, at Al.
34. Report Urges Controls on Indian Gaming Industry, N.Y. TMs, Dec.
19, 1993, at 37.
35. Id.
36. Barry Meier, Casinos Putting Tribes at Odds, N.Y. TMfs, Jan. 13,
1994, at DI, D7. The highest concentration of Indian casinos is in the upper
Midwest. As of 1994, 25 casinos have been opened by Indian tribes in
Minnesota, North and South Dakota. Donald J. Berg, 'Hit Me Again:' A
Geography of Indian Casino Gambling in the Upper Midwest, ABsTRAcTs,
Ass'N or AM. GEoGRAPHERs, 90TH ANN. MEETING, MAR. 29, 1994 - APR. 2,
1994, at 26. At least 15 of these casinos are in Minnesota, which is the highest
number of any state in the nation. Jerry D. Gerlach, A View of Minnesota
Indian Casinos, ABsTRACTS, Ass'N oF AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 90TH ANN. MEETING,
MAR. 29, 1994 - APR. 2, 1994, at 120.
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as "tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments." 3 7 One tribal leader called Indian-run gam-
bling operations the "new buffalo" because they have been a
highly successful means for Indian tribes to feed, clothe, and
shelter members and to improve the quality of life on reserva-
tions s.3 An Indian journalist has described gaming as "the first
thing to come along in 100 years that gives tribes a real chance
to be economically independent. '39
Economic development is not an option for American Indians,
it is a necessity. Gaming ventures are an answer to this critical
need. Indians have traditionally been the poorest racial group
in the United States, experiencing dire poverty. In 1990, nearly
half of the nation's 1.8 million native Americans 40 lived in
poverty and over one-third were unemployed.4 1 Indian tribes
have high expectations for gaming,42 particularly those whose
37. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988).
38. Robert Dvorchak, Without Wampum, Indians Bank on Blackjack,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1993, at A10. See Kristin E. Brink, Indian Gaming,
ABSTRACTS, ASS'N OF AM. GEoGRAPHERS, 90TH ANN. MEETING, MAR. 29, 1994-
APR. 2, 1994, at 39 (reporting that as a result of Indian gaming, economic
conditions are improving on many Indian reservations); Roger E. Dendinger,
Indian Gaming and Reservation Housing in Flandreau, South Dakota, An-
STRACTS, ASS'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 90TH ANN. MEETING, MAR. 29, 1994 -
APR. 2, 1994, at 81 (declaring that in two years, the Royal River Casino on
the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe Reservation in South Dakota created 200
new jobs and brought a measure of prosperity to the reservation); Jerry D.
Gerlach, A View of Minnesota Indian Casinos, ABSTRACTS, Ass'N OF AM.
GEOGRAPHERS, 90TH ANN. MEETING, MAR. 29, 1994 - APR. 2, 1994, at 120
(noting that tribal casinos in Minnesota have had a positive impact for the
Indians).
39. Edward Walsh, Rise of Casino Gambling on Indian Land Sparks
Controversy, WASH. POST, June 16, 1992, at A3 (quoting Tim Giago, editor
of the Lakota Times, an independent weekly Indian newspaper in South
Dakota).
40. Joan Greendeer-Lee and Edna Paisano, 1990 Census Reporting on
American Tribes, ABSTRACTS, Ass'N OF AM. GEOoRAPHERS, 90TH ANN. MEET-
ING, MAR. 29, 1994 - APR. 2, 1994, at 130. There are over 540 tribes in the
nation. Id.
41. George Miller, Progress for Indians is a Film Fantasy, L.A. TMs,
Mar. 26, 1991, at B7. Indian alcoholism is 663% higher than the national
rate, suicide rate is 950 higher, and unemployment is more than 100% higher.
Dvorchak, supra note 38, at A10. See also American Indians; The Landless
Landed, TnE ECONOMIST, June 8, 1991, at 31 (describing conditions on
reservations as close to that of the third world); William L. Chaze, Alcohol,
Poverty - The Killing Fields of Rosebud, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept.
2, 1985, at 52 (describing, as a paradox, Indian poverty amidst vast resources);
Will Lissner, Poverty on the Land, AM. J. ECON. AND SOC., July 1987, 354;
Dominique van de Walle, Population Growth and Poverty: Another Look at
the Indian Time Series Data, J. DEv. STU., Apr. 1985, 429.
42. James Dao, Once Destitute, Oneida Tribe Braces for a Flood ofhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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members are poor.43 A few tribes already appear to have found
gaming to be a bonanza."
Gaming is the most successful economic development oppor-
tunity for Indians in the United States.45 Gaming revenues have
benefited Indians as Congress hoped. Gaming provides for the
tribes' general welfare, a variety of economic development and
social service activities, and new jobs.4 In many instances,
Indian gaming is truly a "new buffalo."
Gambling Profits, N.Y. TmS, July 18, 1993, at 27 (noting expectation of
large revenues by Oneida Indians as they prepare to open Turning Stone
Casino in New York state). See also W. John Moore, A Winning Hand?,
NAT'L L.J., July 17, 1993, at 1796; David Holmstrom, Indian Gaming Booms
Nationwide, CHmSTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Nov. 10, 1992, at 6 (commenting on
competition for gambling profits); David Holmstrom, Bingo! Indian Tribes
Find Way to Make Money, CmsTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Sept. 4, 1991, at 8
(describing tribes' gambling activities after IGRA's enactment); Pauline Yo-
shihashi, Indian Tribes Put Their Bets on Casinos, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1991,
at BI.
43. Dao, supra note 42, at D7. See also Meier, supra note 36, at D7
(discussing casino ventures under consideration by the Gila River Community
of Arizona, which had an unemployment rate of 38%). Indian gaming only
generates 5% of the gaming industry's total profit in the United States, $900
million annually, but that money is significant to many poor tribes. Id.
44. In its first year of operation, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe's casino
in Connecticut grossed more than $750 million. Agnes Palazzetti, Oneida
Indian Leader Staking Claim to the State's First Gambling Casino, BUFFALO
NEWS, Apr. 11, 1992, at D7. Slot machine business was so brisk at Indian
reservations in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and South Dakota that it severely
depleted the supply of quarters at the regional Federal Reserve Bank in
Minneapolis. Amy Feldman, Brother, Can You Spare a Few Million Quarters?,
FORBES, Jan. 18, 1993, at 19. In Minnesota, reservations have become one of
the state's top 20 employers. MINN. INDiAN GAMNG ASS'N, ECONoMIc BENEFIrrS
OF TRAL GAMiNG IN MIwNESOTA 16 (1992) (cited in Eric J. Swanson, The
Reservation Gaming Craze: Casino Gambling Under the Indian Gaming and
Regulatory Act of 1988, 15 Hamline L. Rev. 471 n.177 (1992)). During 1991
the gaming operations of six Indian nations in Minnesota generated $143
million in revenues and profits of $54 million. Lance W. Burr, Broken Promises
Revisited: A Story of the Kickapoo Nation - Kansas Gaming Compact, 32
WAsHsuRN L.J. 16, 26 (1992). See also Kirk Johnson, Indians' Casino Pumps
Up the Volume, N.Y. Tamns, Sept. 1, 1993, at A12 (describing plans to double
the size of the Mashantucket Pequot casino); Shannon Henry, Multiplying
Indian Casinos Draw Critics' Fire, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 2, 1993,
at 12 (commenting on efforts by states and gambling interests to impose limits
on Indian gambling); Moore, supra note 42, at 1796.
45. George Oake, Natives Set Sights on Casinos as U.S. Bands Rake in
the Cash, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 4, 1992, at A15.
46. An Indian gaming facility located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and con-
sisting of high-stakes bingo and video gaming machines, provided the small
Forest County Potawatomi Community with income of approximately $400,000
per month. Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wis. v. Doyle, 828 F.
Supp. 1401, 1407 (W.D.Wis. 1993). The community used the proceeds to
operate an Indian school and perform badly needed renovations on the school's
19951
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The states are killing, or at least crippling, the "new buffalo"
by breaking their deal to negotiate Class III gaming compacts
with Indian tribes. State opposition to and obstruction of Indian
gaming is rampant.4 Congress adopted the IGRA compact
requirement based on the false assumption that the states and
tribes were mutual beneficiaries in Indian gaming.48 Rather,
states and Indian tribes are direct competitors for gaming pro-
ceeds. Legalized gambling is one of the fastest growing economic
activities in the nation49 and states must compete with tribes for
gaming proceeds. 0 The tribes also compete for gaming revenues
buildings. Id. The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Tribe in Minnesota use the
revenues from their casino to pay for new housing, sewers, and roads and
distribute to their members monthly dividends, college scholarships, and trust
funds. Dvorchak, supra note 38, at A10. In Michigan, seven Indian gaming
ventures employed 1,931 people, 62% of them Indians. Burr, supra note 44,
at 27. This decreased unemployment rates at the reservations by 64%. Id.
47. See Virginia Ellis, Indians Say Wilson is Blocking Gaming, L.A. Tilffs,
Sept. 2, 1993, at A3; Steve Wiegand, The Canvas Casino, CAL. J., Aug. 1,
1993, at 25; Iver Peterson, Our Towns: On Horizon, Specter of a Casino,
N.Y. TImms, July 27, 1993, at B6; William Claiborne, Rhode Island Stakes a
Bet Against the Narragansetts; Indian Casino Movement Stops Here, Governor
Says, WASH. POST, May 16, 1993, at A3; Pauline Yoshihashi, As Indian
Casinos Spread, Politicians and Rivals Maneuver to Fight the Trend, WALL
ST. J., May 4, 1993, at BI; Arizona Bars Casino Games, N.Y. TMEs, March
7, 1993, at 15; Dirk Johnson, Raid on Indian Casino Inflames Issue of Self-
Rule, N.Y. TMws, May 17, 1992, at 18; Kirk Johnson, Pequot Casino Faces
Challenges of Success, N.Y. Tims, May 3, 1992, at 46; Paul Lieberman and
Lisa Castiglione, Authorities Raid Gaming Halls Run by 3 Indian Tribes,
L.A. Tims, Oct. 31, 1991, at A3; Holmstrom, Indian Gaming Booms Na-
tionwide, supra note 42, at 6.
48. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 13.
49. John F. Lounsbury, The Development of a Major Gaming Center in
Southeastern Nevada, ABSTRACTS, Ass'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 90TH ANN.
MEETING, MAR. 29, 1994 - APR. Z, 1994, at 225. This growth has proceeded
over the last ten years. Id. As of early 1994, all but two states have sanctioned
some form of gambling. Id. Casino gaming now not only exists in Nevada
and Atlantic City, but also on riverboats and Indian Reservations in at least
23 states. Id. Riverboat casinos are the most current rage in gambling around
the nation. At least 34 of these operate in Mississippi River states, 19 in
Mississippi alone, with Illinois ranking next with 10. Curtis Wilkie, Casinos
Raise Money, Doubts in Mississippi, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 1994, at 1, 14.
50. A Florida state senator, urging approval of a referendum by Florida
voters to allow casino gambling in the state, estimated casinos will provide
80,000 jobs, reduce the state's unemployment by a full percentage point, pump
$3 to $4 billion in Florida's economy, and create $500 million a year in new
tax revenues. To Some, Florida's Approval of Casinos is a Foregone Conclu-
sion, BosToN GLOBE, March 27, 1994, at 18.
Mississippi has opened itself up to extensive development of casino gam-
bling along the Mississippi River and the Gulf Coast. Wilkie, supra note 49,
at 1, 14. See also Klaus J. Meyer-Arendt, From River to the Sea - Dockside
Gambling in Mississippi (Abstract), ABSTRACTS, ASs'NpOr AM. GEOGRAPHERS,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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with local governments,5' major gaming companies (in Las Vegas
and Atlantic City),52 and even each other.5 a In the competition
for gambling dollars, states have aimed the crosshairs of the
Eleventh Amendment at the "new buffalo" - Indian gaming.
III. IGRA'S PRoVIsIoN s
A. Classes of Gaming
IGRA creates a relatively simple framework for regulating
Indian gaming. IGRA divides gaming into three classes, each of
which is subject to a different level of state and federal intrusion.
Class I gaming consists of social gaming for "prizes of minimal
value" or traditional Indian games 5 4 and is only subject to
tribal regulation." Class II gaming includes bingo, games similar
90TH ANN. MEETING, MA. 29, 1994 - APR. 2, 1994, at 254. In five counties
alone, between August 1992 and September 1993, 11 dockside casinos opened,
and licenses were approved or were pending approval for 40 more. Meyer-
Arendt, at 254. Casino gambling has generated substantial state revenues since
1993, the first full year of their operation in the state. In that year, casinos
reported $790 million in revenues and paid taxes of $65 million. Wilke, supra
note 49, at 14. The state treasury is enjoying a surplus. Id. A state economic
planning agency estimates the gaming industry will create 37,000 new jobs and
$130 million in state taxes by the end of fiscal 1994. Id.
Gaming has been proposed as a source for raising funds for the federal
government, particularly to support President Clinton's proposed health care
reform.
51. See Holstrom, Indian Gaming Booms Nationwide, supra note 43, at
6; Yoshihashi, As Indian Casinos Spread, Politicians and Rivals Maneuver to
Fight the Trend, supra note 47, at B1.
52. For example, casino owner and real-estate magnate Donald Trump is
an outspoken foe of competition from Indian casinos. Trump's views are
representative of a long-standing opposition by the gambling industry to
reservation-based gambling. See Coleman McCarthy, Trumped-up Assault On
Indian Gambling, WASH. PosT, Oct. 26, 1993, at D18; see also Nick Ravo,
How a Tribe in Connecticut is Taking on Atlantic City, N.Y. TnMss, Apr.
14, 1991 at D6. Recently, however, major Las Vegas and Atlantic City based
casino companies have joined Indian tribes in casino business ventures. This
trend has irritated state and local officials. See, e.g., Ceasars World to Invest
in Indian Casino, N.Y. TEins, July 22, 1993, at D4 (discussing plans for a
$25 million casino in Palm Springs, California); Christopher Palmeri, Smoke
Signals ?, FORBES, Aug. 3, 1992, at 19 (discussing plans by Mirage Resorts to
operate tribal casinos); Pauline Yoshihash, Mirage Joins with Indians in Casino
Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1992, at B1.
53. Pauline Yoshihashi, Arizona, Two Tribes Tentatively Agree to Settle
Fight Over Indians' Gambling, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1993, at B10. Giant
gaming companies with operations in Atlantic City and Las Vegas, which once
opposed Indian gaming, are now allied with Indian tribes. See also Meier,
supra note 36, at D7. These Indian and gaming company projects are now in
competition with those of other tribes. Id. Furthermore, within many Indian
tribes there is disagreement over whether to enter the gambling businesses.
See, e.g., James Dao, Casino Issue Divides Mohawk Reservation in New
York, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1993, at 33.
54. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988). Class I gaming is defined as follows: "(6)
19951
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to bingo like pull-tabs, punch boards and tip jars, and certain
"nonbank" card games.5 6 Tribes may engage in Class II gaming
without interference from state regulation, so long as the state
in which a tribe is located allows similar gaming.57 Class II
gaming is subject to several IGRA requirements and formali-
ties 58 including oversight by the National Indian Gaming Com-
mission.59
The term 'class I gaming' means social games solely for prizes of minimal
value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as part
of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations." Id.
55. 25 U.S.C. §2710(a)(1) (1988).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7). Regarding Class II gaming, the statute provides:
(A) The term "class II" gaming means -
(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether
or not electronic, computer, or other technologic aids are used
in connection therewith) -
(I) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes,
with cards bearing numbers or other designations,
(II) in which the holder of the card covers such numbers
or designations when objects, similarly numbered or desig-
nated, are drawn or electronically determined, and
(III) in which the game is won by the first person covering
a previously designated arrangement of numbers or desig-
nations on such cards, including (if played in the same
location) pull tabs, lotto, punch boards, tips jars, instant
bingo, and other games similar to bingo, and
(ii) card games that -
(I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or
(II) are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State
and are played at any location in the State,
but only if such card games are played in conformity with
those laws and regulations (if any) of the State regarding hours
or periods of operation of such card games or limitations on
wagers or pot sizes in such card games.
(B) The term "class II gaming" does not include -
(i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de
fer, or blackjack (21), or
(ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of
chance or slot machines of any kind.
Id.
57. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A). This provision of IGRA incorporated the
Cabazon test, in which the Supreme Court allowed Indian gaming by any
person, organization, or entity without state interference provided that the
state in which the tribe was located allowed such gaming. See infra part IV.C.
To obtain authority to self-regulate Class II gaming, the Indian tribe must
conform" to certain requirements. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(3). The most important
requirement is that the tribe must have conducted Class II gaming for at least
three years in an honest manner and with a good reputation. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(c)(3)-(4)(A).
58. Class II card games are allowed only if the tribe conducts them in
conformity with state laws and regulations, if any, regarding hours of operation
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Class III gaming encompasses all other forms of gaming,
including more sophisticated, high-stakes gambling, such as ca-
sino gaming.60 Class III gaming can be conducted only if such
gaming is permitted within the state by any person for any
purpose. 6' This category of gaming is subject to the greatest
degree of federal and state involvement. To satisfy the federal
requirements, the tribe must adopt a gaming ordinance which
has been approved by the Chairman of the National Indian
Gaming Commission. 2
B. Tribal-State Compacts
The compact requirement provides an opportunity for state
influence in Class III gaming. In order to conduct Class III
gaming, a tribe must negotiate a compact with the state setting
forth which games can be played and governing their conduct. 63
The compact mechanism gives the state an opening to either
influence or directly regulate Class III gaming on Indian lands.
The compact can even extend state civil and criminal jurisdiction
onto Indian lands."
IGRA provides a "framework" for negotiation and enforce-
ment of tribal-state gaming compacts. 65 The tribe must request
or limitations on wagers or pot sizes. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii). The net
revenues of Class II gaming can only be used by the tribal government for
the general welfare of tribal members, tribal economic development, or do-
nations to charitable organizations or local government agencies. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(b)(2)(B).
59. To conduct Class II gaming, a tribe's governing body must adopt an
ordinance or resolution authorizing the gaming activities and prescribing
operating regulations. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(B). The ordinance or resolution
is subject to the approval of the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming
Commission. Id.
60. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). Again, this is the Cabazon test. See infra
part IV.C.
62. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A).
63. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii). Tribal-state compacts can include
provisions regarding the application of criminal and civil laws and regulations,
allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between tribe and state, taxation
by the tribe, remedies for breach of contract, standards for the operation and
maintenance of gaming facilities including licensing, and any other subjects
directly related to the operation of gaming activities. Id. The compact takes
effect only after approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(3)(B). IGRA prevents states from using the compact to intrude into
Indian affairs. The legislative history indicates that states cannot use the
compact process to exclude Indian tribes from Class III gaming or to protect
other state licensed enterprises from free market competition with the tribes.
S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 3. The statute expressly forbids use of the
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that a state negotiate a compact .66 The state must then negotiate
in "good faith." ' 67 IGRA's jurisdictional provision, section
2710(d)(7), allows the tribes to enforce the compact process in
federal courts. 68 Section 2710(d)(7) grants jurisdiction to the
federal courts over any9 cause of action brought by an Indian
tribe arising from a state's failure to enter compact negotiations
or to conduct negotiations in good faith. 69 A federal court may
order a tribe or state to reach a compact if the state fails to
meet its burden of showing that it negotiated in good faith.70 If
the state and the tribe cannot reach an agreement, IGRA em-
powers the court to appoint a mediator to develop one. 7'
Most IGRA litigation focuses on federal jurisdiction. 72 Begin-
ning in 1991, states began to challenge federal court jurisdiction
to hear Indian suits to enforce the compacting process by
compact as precedent for imposing any revenue-raising taxes or assessments
on any activities on Indian lands if there is no other basis for imposing such
tax or assessment. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4).
65. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 275 (8th
Cir. 1993).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
67. Id.
68. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
69. The provision also grants jurisdiction to the federal courts over any
other cause of action initiated by a state or Indian tribe to enjoin Class III
gaming. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7)(A)(ii).
70. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). Upon introduction of evidence by the
tribe that negotiations began more than 180 days before, no tribal-state
compact was concluded, and the state did not respond to requests for nego-
tiations or did not respond in good faith, the burden of proof shifts to the
state to prove that it negotiated in good faith. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii). In deter-
mining whether the state negotiated in good faith, the court may consider
"the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse
economic impacts on existing gaming activities." § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(I). Upon
finding the state has not acted in good faith, the court may order the parties
to reach a compact within 60 days. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
71. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(iv)-(vii). If the tribe and state fail to reach a
compact within 60 days, the court may appoint a mediator who considers the
"last best offer" from each side and selects one of the proposals to be the
final compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). The proposed compact becomes
the governing compact if the state consents within sixty days. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi). If the state fails to consent within 60 days, the Secretary
of Interior, in consultation with the tribe, determines how gaming should be
conducted and controlled on Indian land, prescribing procedures consistent
with the proposed compact selected by the mediator, IGRA's provisions, and
relevant state law. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
72. The initial lawsuits brought in federal courts by the tribes against the
states concerning Class III activities under IGRA were over whether the states
were negotiating in good faith. See infra part VII (discussing the IGRA
litigation).
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asserting an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense.73
The United States Courts of Appeal have split on this question. 74
IV. Pam-IGRA CAsE LAw
A. Supreme Court Recognition of Indian Sovereignty,
Limitation of State Jurisdiction, and Plenary Power of
Congress
To determine if states can validly claim sovereign immunity
from suits to enforce IGRA's compact provision, it is necessary
to examine not only Eleventh Amendment law, but also pre-
IGRA federal Indian law and the congressional intent behind
IGRA. Although subject to the overriding power of the federal
constitution, Indian tribes are self-governing entities with the
power to establish their own laws governing their people and
lands. 75 Like the states, Indian tribes have authority to devise
laws governing conduct within their own borders.
The Supreme Court has characterized Indian tribes as "do-
mestic dependant nations" that possess all the powers of gov-
ernment that the United States has not expressly removed or
held to be inconsistent with the tribes' status as domestic de-
pendant nations.76 As a result of the tribe's status, Congress has
73. See supra note 19.
74. See infra part VII (discussing these cases).
75. It is ironic that in the beginning of the Indian gaming controversy
tribes claimed sovereign protection against the intrusion of state authority.
States now assert that their sovereignty protects them against federal court
enforcement of IGRA's compact requirement.
76. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). In Cherokee
Nation, Chief Justice Marshall denied the Cherokee Tribe's request for an
injunction to prevent the execution of a series of laws passed by the Georgia
legislature that divided all Cherokee lands into existing Georgia counties,
extended Georgia laws and authority over all Cherokee lands, and annulled
all Cherokee laws and ordinances. Id. at 7. Chief Justice Marshall rejected
the Cherokee Tribe's claim that it was a "foreign nation" within the meaning
of Article III, sec. 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution which confers
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over suits between foreign nations
and the states or citizens. Id. at 17. Marshall wrote that the tribes are "domestic
dependant nations" because they tacitly gave up their pre-existing sovereign
right to deal with any other nation but the United States. Id. at 17, 18. He
further noted:
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well
as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and
dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their
lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of
hostility.
Id.; See also FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 231 (1982). ("The recognition of tribal self-government embodied
in federal legislation and treaties preempts competing assertions of state
authority.").
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plenary power to legislate with respect to Indians and Indian
tribes." The scope of federal power over Indian tribes is almost
limitless while that of the states is severely limited.78
The concept of Indian sovereignty has its roots in opinions
by Chief Justice Marshall over 160 years ago in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia"9 and Worcester v. Georgia.80 In these opinions, the
Court first pronounced the federal government's unassailable
authority over Indian tribes and delineated the respective sov-
ereign statuses of the tribes, states, and federal government. In
Cherokee Nation, Marshall first characterized Indian tribes as
domestic dependant nations in relation to the United States.8'
In Worcester, Marshall made it clear that even though Indian
tribes are "dependant" nations they are still sovereign entities82
with inherent rights to self-government.83 Moreover, because
tribes are sovereign entities, states have few rights to impose
regulations on them. Marshall observed that because Indian
77. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903).
78. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550. See generally
COHEN, supra note 76, at 259-79 (describing the scope of state powers).
79. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
80. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In Worcester, a missionary appealed his
conviction and incarceration under a Georgia statute that made it illegal for
a non-Indian to enter the Cherokee lands without permission from the governor
of Georgia. Id. at 536. Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court and held
that Georgia lacked authority to regulate activities within Cherokee lands,
ruling that the federal government possessed sole and exclusive authority to
regulate Indian affairs as a matter of constitutional law. Id. at 561-62.
81. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. "[The Indian tribes] may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations." Id.
82. 31 U.S. at 559-60.
The very term "nation," so generally applied to [Indian tribes],
means "a people distinct from others." The constitution, by
declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to
be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the
previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits
their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.
The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves,
having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have
applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other
nations of the earth.
Id.
83. Id. at 559. Marshall stated:
The Indian Nations had always been considered independent,
political communities .... mhe settled doctrine of the law of
nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence
- its right to self government, by associating with a stronger,
and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for
its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more
powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and
ceasing to be a state.
Id. at 559-61.
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nations are dependant on the United States they are subject only
to limitations imposed by the federal government and not to
state laws . 4
There are two important facets to the federal relationship
with tribal governments. The first is the federal "trust obliga-
tion" toward the tribes and the second is Congress' plenary
power over Indian relations in the United States. As will be
discussed later in this article, congressional plenary power is
pivotal in federal court decisions over whether or not to enforce
the compact requirement in the face of the Eleventh Amendment
defense.
The trust obligation is a duty of protection the federal gov-
ernment owes to the tribes. Chief Justice Marshall, in Cherokee
Nation, appears to be the first to describe this guardianship
relationship. Marshall observed that in their status as domestic
dependant nations the tribes' "relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 85 The trust obligation
creates not only a duty upon the federal government to deal
fairly with Indian nations" but also serves as a source of
extensive power to legislate on matters concerning Indian af-
fairsY
In Worcester, Marshall described the plenary power88 of the
federal government over Indian affairs. He concluded that the
84. Id. at 561. There are three exceptions: consent, treaties with the national
government, or acts of Congress.
The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cher-
okees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts
of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and
this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the gov-
ernment of the United States.
Id.
85. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. Marshall further observed: "[Indian tribes]
look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great
father." Id.
86. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (recognizing the federal
government's responsibility to deal fairly with Indians, whether tribal members
living on or off the reservation); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286 (1942) (ruling that the federal government owes a trust obligation to
rectify violations of a 19th century treaty); United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28, 45-48 (1913) (stressing that Congress has the power and duty to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes, as well as the duty to care for and
protect all dependant Indian communities).
87. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (noting that the trust
obligation allows Congress to enact legislation that singles out Indians for
preferential treatment).
88. Plenary power has been defined as: "Authority and power as broad
as is required in a given case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990).
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Indian" Commerce Clause,8 9 along with the Treaty Clause, 9°
permitted Congress to do all that is required for complete control
over Indian matters. By including Indian tribes in the Commerce
Clause the framers tried to protect them from state interfer-
ence. 91 Congressional plenary power over Indian affairs became
particularly important after 1871, when Congress ended the era
of treaty-making with Indian tribes, which was exclusively under
the authority of the President and Senate, and shifted control
of Indian affairs to direct congressional legislation. 9 With this
shift, the Indian Commerce Clause became the basis for the
plenary authority of congressional legislation, and the Supreme
Court has come to regard the scope of this congressional power
as almost limitless.93
89. U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 3 "The Congress shall have the power ...
to regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes."
90. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 "[Tlhe President shall have power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties .. ."; U.S.
CoNsT., art. VI, cl. 2 "[A]II Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land".
91. Rachel San Kronowitz et. al., Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
REv. 507, (1987).
92. Appropriations Act of Mar 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566
(1871). In 1871 Congress passed a law prohibiting the federal government
from making additional treaties with the Indian tribes (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1988)). This law was the result of the political jealously of the House
of Representatives against the Senate and the abuses of treaties by the executive
branch. The House of Representatives was shut out of Indian treaty formu-
lation, which was the constitutional duty of the President and the Senate,
although the House did act on its own Constitutional appropriation duty to
fund these treaties. Raymond Cross, De-Federalizing American Indian Com-
merce: Toward A New Political Economy for Indian County, 16 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 445, 456, n.32 (1993). The President, represented by treaty
commissioners around the nation, conducted Indian policy in the executive
branch. Id. Resenting the Senate's power to ratify treaties and the lack of
having any role in treaty formulation, the House demanded the end of treaty-
making and a shift to legislating Indian affairs which involved a larger role
for itself in overseeing Indian policy. Id. Moreover, the abuses in making and
complying with treaties with Indians had degenerated into a "cruel farce" by
time of the legislative prohibition on treaty-making. Id. at 457 n.34. See also
Kronowitz et. al., supra note 9, at 507 (1987).
93. See e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982)
(holding Congress has authority to divest tribal authority to tax non-Indians
on Indian lands); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980)
(acknowledging paramount authority of Congress over Indian property); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (recognizing Congressional
authority to limit, change or eliminate tribal governmental powers); Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209-12 (1978) (recognizing Con-
gressional authority to define criminal, civil or regulatory jurisdiction of Indian
tribes); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (holding Congress
has plenary authority to legislate for Indian tribes on all matters, includinghttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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The domestic dependent status of Indian nations explained in
Worcester and Cherokee Nation provides the conceptual foun-
dation for federal supremacy over Indian affairs and correspond-
ingly provides the basis for excluding state authority over Indian
tribesY4 Likening Indian tribes to foreign nations justifies sub-jecting them to federal treatymaking." Likening them to wards
rationalizes the federal government's exclusive guardianship role
over the Indian tribes. 6 When Congress enacted IGRA, it did
so recognizing no state power over Indian affairs but relying on
plenary federal authority."
B. Bryan v. Itasca County: Civil-Regulatory - Criminal-
Prohibitory Test and Indian Gaming
The semisovereign status of Indian tribes is at the heart of
the Indian gaming controversy. This sovereign authority gives
Indian tribes the power to establish laws governing their people
and lands, subject only to the overriding power of federal law.9
In most instances, the tribes' special status also bars any state
regulation of Indian tribes. 9 Thus, states had no control over
gaming on Indian territory for non-Indians until Congress granted
their form of government); Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 85-86 (1977) (recognizing authority of Congress to control tribal
assets); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 585-88, 594 (1977)
(recognizing Congressional authority to reduce tribal reservation boundaries
without tribal consent or compensation and abrogate treaties); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (recognizing Congressional plenary power
to legislate on behalf of Indian tribes). See generally Nell Jessup Newton,
Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 195 (1984).
94. See Cross, supra note 92, at 447 n.10.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 5.
It is a long- and well-established principle of Federal-Indian law
as expressed in the United States Constitution, reflected in Federal
statutes, and articulated in decisions of the Supreme Court, that
unless authorized by an act of Congress, the jurisdiction of State
governments and the application of state laws do not extend to
Indian lands. In modern times, even when Congress has enacted
laws to allow a limited application of State law on Indian lands,
the Congress has required the consent of tribal governments before
State jurisdiction can be extended to tribal lands.
Id.
98. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207. "[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and
subordinate to, only the Federal government, not the States." Id. (quoting
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 154 (1980)).
99. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
state jurisdiction).
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them" that authority in Public Law 83-280 (Public Law 280).1°°
Enacted in 1953, Public Law 280 expanded state authority
over Indian affairs in five states.10' The principal purpose of
Public Law 280 was to extend those states' criminal jurisdiction
"over offenses committed by or against Indians... to the same
extent that such State has jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the State." 0 2 Public Law 280 also allowed the
five states to apply their civil jurisdiction, provided it was "to
the same extent such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes
of action" in non-Indian areas. 03
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Bryan v. Itasca County' 4 held
that the civil jurisdiction Congress granted the states in Public
Law 280 was substantially narrower than the criminal jurisdic-
tion. 105 The Court noted that Public Law 280 granted civil
jurisdiction only for civil court proceedings involving Indians
and private citizens.' 6 The Court concluded that Public Law
280 did not allow the states to enforce all state civil laws on
Indian lands, particularly civil-regulatory laws.0 7
100. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
101. 67 Stat. 588 §§ 2, 4. Until 1968, the law also provided an option for
the extension of authority to other states. It transferred to California, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin criminal and civil jurisdiction over
designated Indian lands. Id. These states were specified because they wished
to assume this jurisdiction and most of the affected Indian tribes had supported
the transfer of jurisdiction because they were not sufficiently organized to
exercise this authority themselves. S. Rep. No. 699, 83 Cong., 1st Sess. 848
(1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2412. Until 1968 other states
were permitted to acquire such jurisdiction if they chose to do so. Pub. L.
No. 83-280 § 7, 67 Stat. 590. Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and Washington
exercised this authority. This provision was repealed in 1968. Act of April 11,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 73. After 1968, states seeking to
assume jurisdiction on Indian lands required the consent of the affected tribe.
Since then no tribes have consented and no new states have been permitted
to acquire jurisdiction under Public Law 280. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3,
at 2 n.l.
102. Pub. L. No. 83-280 § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162).
103. Pub. L. No. 83-280 § 4, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
104. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). In Bryan the Court held that a statute allowing
counties to tax personal property did not apply to property on Indian land.
Id. at 375. The court affirmed a previous holding in McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), which held a state could not extend
taxation to Indian lands without Congressional authorization. Id. at 376-77.
The Court ruled that Public Law 280 did not provide the necessary authori-
zation. Id. at 378-79.
105. Id. at 387-90.
106. Id. at 383. The Court held that Congress intended the civil jurisdiction
provision to be limited to the resolution of civil legal disputes. Id. at 385,
391.
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Bryan formed the foundation for the "civil-regulatory versus
criminal-prohibitory" test.'08 Under this test, states can only
enforce statutes that are criminal-prohibitory in nature, not civil-
regulatory, on Indian lands.'°9 Consequently, state authority on
Indian lands extends only to those activities that are prohibited
under state law and not those merely subject to regulation.110
The net result of Bryan was that the corpus of state regulatory
laws are not generally enforceable on Indian lands."'
In the late 1970s, Indian tribes began to run significant gaming
operations. The most notable of these were the high-stakes bingo
games of the Seminole Tribe in Florida and the Oneida Tribe
in Wisconsin. Both Wisconsin" 2 and Florida"3 had laws which
imposed limits upon the frequency of bingo games and the size
of prizes. Wisconsin and Florida were also "280 states. 1 1 '4 The
Fifth Circuit in Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth"5 and a Wisconsin
federal district court in Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin"6
ruled, however, that under the Bryan test, Florida and Wisconsin
lacked jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to regulate gaming
occurring on Indian lands. The courts in Butterworth'17 and
Oneida"" held that these statutes governing bingo were more
regarded by the Court to be a general regulatory power. Id. In reviewing
Congressional intent the Court noted the "absence of anything remotely
resembling an intention to confer general state civil regulatory control over
Indian reservations." Id. at 384.
108. The Minnesota Supreme Court had held that § 4(a) of Public Law 280
created a general grant of the power to tax. 426 U.S. at 378. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, concluding that "the primary intent of § 4 was
to grant jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians
in state court." 426 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 390. For a case applying the Bryan test, see Seminole Tribe v.
Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1020 (1982). See also, Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215-16, n.17.
110. 426 U.S. at 390.
111. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 313.
112. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 163.51 (West 1989).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.0931 (West 1994).
114. Wisconsin was one of the original five states to which Public Law 280
transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction when the statute was enacted in
1953. See supra note 101. Florida assumed criminal jurisdiction over Indian
tribes prior to 1968, when the law repealed the provision allowing states to
extend jurisdiction to Indian lands without tribal consent. Butterworth, 658
F.2d. at 312-13.
115. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Unit B, Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020
(1982).
116. 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
117. 658 F.2d at 314 ("Bingo appears to fall into a category of gambling
that the state has chosen to regulate by imposing certain limitations to avoid
abuses.").
118. 518 F. Supp. at 719 ("[B]ecause it appears that Wisconsin's bingo laws
are not designed to prohibit the general populace from playing bingo, it seems
that those laws are regulatory rather than prohibitory . . ").
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civil-regulatory than criminal-prohibitory in nature because rather
than prohibiting all bingo operations, the states imposed regu-
latory limitations.
C. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians: Freeing
Indian Gaming from State Regulation
After the Oneida and Butterworth decisions, tribal bingo
operations exploded around the country." 9 Other tribal victories
in federal courts followed as states increasingly opposed Indian
bingo. 120 The Supreme Court resolved the question of state
authority over Indian gaming in 1987 in California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians.2 '
Cabazon made clear that state laws are inapplicable on Indian
reservations unless Congress directs otherwise. In Cabazon, the
Court affirmed and refined the criminal-prohibitory, civil-regu-
latory test in determining whether states could claim Public Law
280 jurisdiction over Indian gaming.'2 The decision was a
striking victory for Indian tribes. The Court ruled that Indian
tribes have exclusive authority to regulate gaming on their lands,
subject only to federal law, and to state laws to the extent they
make any type of gaming completely illegal.'23 The Cabazon
decision was particularly significant because it went beyond
bingo and opened the door for tribes to conduct casino-style
gambling. 24
The Cabazon case concerned the Cabazon and Morongo Bands
of Mission Indians. The Bands, which had previously operated
a bingo hall, opened a card club at which mostly non-Indians
119. By 1986, 108 tribes had gaming facilities, 104 of them involved bingo.
Gross receipts for gambling on Indian reservations exceeded $100 million a
year by this time. S. REP. No. 493, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986). Virtually
all the Indian bingo activities started after the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Butterworth in 1981. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 2.
120. E.g., Barona Group of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F. 2d 1185 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v.
McGuigan, 626 F. Supp. 245 (D. Conn. 1986).
121. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). This case spurred Congress to wrap up enactment
of IGRA which partially codified Cabazon. See S. REP. No. 446, supra note
3, at 4.
The significance of Cabazon was raised during the floor debate on IGRA,
with Senator Dan Evans stating, for example, that "[t]his law should be
considered within the line of developed case law extending over a century and
a half by the Supreme Court, including the basic principles set forth in the
Cabazon decision." 134 CONG. REc. 24,027 (1988).
122. 480 U.S. at 209-11.
123. Id. at 214-22.
124. Id. at 210-14.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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played casino-type card games.'25 California was one the original
five states to which Public Law 280 transferred criminal juris-
diction in 1953.'2 California law permitted bingo and card
games, but limited them to designated charitable organizations,
restricted prizes to $250, and confined the use of profits to
charitable purposes.'2 7 The Cabazon Band sought declaratory
relief in federal court when California threatened to use the
criminal sanctions in the bingo statute against them.128
Seeking to apply Bryan, California claimed that they could
enforce their bingo law against the Indians because it was
criminal-prohibitory in nature rather than civil-regulatory. 29 Cal-
ifornia claimed that the criminal aspect of its law was achieved
by subjecting violators to criminal penalties. 3 0 Noting that under
Bryan a state can prohibit activities on Indian lands that are
otherwise prohibited elsewhere in a state, California claimed
that it did not regulate bingo but rather prohibited high stakes
unregulated bingo.'
The Supreme Court found that the California bingo statute
was not a criminal law. a2 Acknowledging there was no bright
line to determine whether a state law is criminal-prohibitory or
civil-regulatory,'33 the Court developed a two-prong test to de-
termine the classification of a state law.134
The first prong is a public policy test. If the act to which the
law is directed is considered contrary to the public policy of the
state, then the statute is a criminal prohibition. a5 The Court
concluded that the bingo law was not prohibitory under the
public policy test because California not only allowed but even
promoted numerous forms of gambling. 36 Cabazon made clear
125. Id. at 204-05. Only the Cabazon Indians opened a card club casino.
Id.
126. See supra note 101 (describing Public Law 280).
127. 480 U.S. at 205 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 326.5 (West Supp.
1987)).
128. 480 U.S. 205-06. The district court granted the Band's motion for
summary judgement, holding that California lacked authority to enforce its
gambling laws on the reservation. Id. at 206. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.
129. Id. at 207-12.
130. Id. at 209.
131. Id. at 211.
132. Id. ("[T]hat an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as
well as civil means does not necessarily convert into a criminal law within the
meaning of Public law 280.").
133. 480 U.S. at 210.
134. Id. at 209-10, 216.
135. Id. at 209 ("[T]he shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue
violates the State's public policy.").
136. Id. at 210-11. The Court stated:
California does not prohibit all forms of gambling. California
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that gambling will not be found to be against a state's public
policy if a state permits even minor gaming, such as charitable
bingo.'37
The second prong of the Cabazon test balances state interests
against federal and tribal interests.'38 California claimed a need
to exercise police power over gaming in the state, particularly
to protect against the infiltration of organized crime into Indian
gaming.139 The Court determined that California's fear of or-
ganized crime was not supported by sufficient evidence. 4 0 The
Court rejected the State's asserted general interest in prohibiting
tribal gaming because California permitted numerous kinds of
off-reservation gambling. 141
itself operates a state lottery, and daily encourages its citizens to
participate in this state-run gambling. California also permits
parimutuel horse-race betting. Although certain enumerated gam-
bling games are prohibited [under California law], games not
enumerated, including the card games played in the Cabazon card
club, are permissible. In light of the fact that California permits
a substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and
actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must
conclude that California regulates rather prohibits gambling in
general and bingo in particular.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 211 n.141. Congress later codified this public policy test in
IGRA. IGRA allows Class II and Class III gaming on Indian lands unless
not "permitted for any purpose by any person" on non-Indian lands. 25
U.S.C. § 2703(7)-(8) (1988).
See, e.g., Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D. Wis. 1991), appeal dismissed 957
F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying the Cabazon test to determine "whether
Wisconsin's public policy toward Class III gaming is prohibitory or regula-
tory."); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 975 (1991) ("Connecticut permits games of
chance, albeit in highly regulated form. Thus such gaming is not totally
repugnant to the State's public policy."); United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 366, 368 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that "Congress
adopted a modified version of the Cabazon test ... Thus, as a court our
task is to assess whether South Dakota's gaming law is prohibitory or regu-
latory.").
138. 480 U.S. at 216. "Decision in this case turns on whether state authority
is pre-empted by the operation of federal law; and '[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-
empted ... if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to
justify the assertion of state authority."' Id. (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 220-22. California had claimed that the difference in pots between
the statutorily restricted games on non-Indian lands and the high stakes gaming
on Indian reservations would attract organized crime to infiltrate Indian
gaming. Id. at 221.
140. Id. at 221.
141. Id. at 220-21.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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The Court found that the federal and tribal interests in
gaming, however, strongly outweighed state interests. 142 The
Court concluded that California had only a minimal interest in
preventing organized crime compared to both federal and tribal
interests in Indian self-sufficiency and economic development. 14
The Court emphasized that its "inquiry [proceeded] in light of
traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional
goal of Indian self-government, including its 'overriding goal'
of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic develop-
ment." 1" The Court acknowledged substantial efforts by the
federal government to assist Indian gaming, which it saw as
part of a federal policy of promoting tribal self-rule and internal
development. 4 5 The Court found the economic interests of the
Cabazon Band and other Indians in gaming particularly strong.'"
Gaming often represented the sole source of revenue for the
tribal governments and the major source of tribal employment. 47
The Court emphasized that "[s]elf-determination and economic
development are not within reach if the Tribes cannot raise
revenues and provide employment for their members."' 4 The
court further noted: "The[se] Tribes' interests obviously parallel
the federal interests."' 49
Cabazon provided a basis for IGRA. The congressional find-
ings incorporated the public policy test. 50 Additionally, IGRA
specifically requires that if a state permits any person to conduct
a type Class II or Class III gaming for any purpose, then the
tribes are entitled to conduct such gaming on their lands in
142. Id.
143. 480 U.S. at 220-22.
144. Id. at 216.
145. Id. at 217-19. At this time, the Department of Interior had strongly
supported Indian gaming and opposed legislation which would limit gaming
as a source of revenues for tribes. Id. at 217-18 n.21 (quoting a policy directive
that the Assistant Secretary of the Interior issued on March 2, 1983). Several
federal agencies had provided technical and financial assistance to Indian
gaming projects. Id. at 217-18.
146. Id. at 219. California had argued that the tribes were merely marketing
an exemption from state gambling laws, and thus, "merely importing a product
onto the reservations for immediate resale to non-Indians." Id. This argument,
if valid, would diminish the tribes' interests in gaming activities. Id.
147. Id. at 205.
148. 480 U.S. at 219.
149. Id.
150. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) states:
Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity
on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited
by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not,
as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming
activity.
25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (emphasis added).
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accordance with negotiated compacts for Class III gaming ac-
tivities. 5 1 The balancing of state, tribal, and Indian interests
was clearly a concern in congressional enactment of IGRA.'5 2
Moreover, Congress stated that it, not the Supreme Court, is
responsible for weighing these interests. IGRA shows that it is
Congress' role to resolve the conflict between the three key
participants in Indian gaming, namely the tribes, federal gov-
ernment, and state governments.' 53
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IGRA AND THE COMPACT
REQUIREMENT
A. Sowing the Seeds for Failure of the Compact Provision
IGRA's legislative history reveals the conflict and tension
between state and tribal interests in gaming. Congress hoped
that compacting would resolve or diminish the clash of state
and tribal interests over the major forms of gambling covered
by IGRA's Class III category. Compacts failed to resolve the
state-tribal dispute. This failure can be attributed to three causes:
Congress failed to carefully consider the compact provision;
Congress attempted to dodge the state-tribal conflict; and Con-
gress attempted to strike a compromise between irreconcilable
positions.
First, Congress did not sufficiently examine the compact meas-
ure. Although Congress debated Indian gaming legislation for
several years, it waffled on the issue of state jurisdiction over
casinos and other sophisticated gaming.5 4 Only at the last minute
did Congress adopt state-tribal compacts as a legislative solu-
tion. 55
Second, the compact provision represents Congressional hand-
washing of the conflict between states and tribes. The states'
and tribes' inability to solve their gaming conflicts was a major
reason for federal regulation of gaming on Indian lands in the
151. .25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A) (Class II); 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(1)(B) [Class
III).
152. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
153. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 3.
154. A considerable portion of the discussion of the legislative history of
IGRA is drawn from Roland J. Santoni, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act:
How Did We Get Here? Where are We Going?, 26 CREIGHTON L. Rlv. 387,
395-403 (1993).
155. Id. at 403. The legislative journey which began in November 1983 with
the introduction of HR 4566 ended five years later with the passage of IGRA
on October 17, 1988. Id. at 395-96. The final version of IGRA containing the
compact concept was developed in the final weeks before passage. rd. at 403.https://opens holarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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first place.156 But, unlike the provisions for Class I and Class
II gaming, in which Congress dictated how such types of gaming
could occur on tribal lands, 5 7 Congress left the question of how
to solve Class III gambling problems to the states and tribes. 15 8
Expecting these two entities to resolve differences that Congress
could not resolve was unrealistically optimistic.
Third, Congress attempted to compromise irreconcilable dif-
ferences between the states and tribes with the compact provi-
sion. The favorable judicial decisions prior to IGRA had removed
nearly all obstruction by the states to Indian gaming activities
and had given the tribes a superior position. In the Class III
gaming provisions, Congress legislated away the tribes' judicial
victories and, with the compact provision, unwittingly provided
the states with another tool to delay and impede Indian gaming.
Examining the legislative development of IGRA during the
1980s illuminates the varying interests, tensions, and options
facing Congress and ultimate scheme it chose to regulate gam-
bling on Indian lands. The committee report characterizes IGRA
as "the outgrowth of several years of discussions and negotia-
tions between gaming tribes, States, the gaming industry, the
administration, and the Congress .... ',159 In enacting IGRA,
Congress announced that it hoped to "balance [these] competing
policy interests ....
For Indian peoples, Congress hoped IGRA would allow "the
operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency and strong tribal
governments . . . ."61 IGRA purported to address state and
federal concerns that criminal elements, including organized
crime, would infiltrate Indian gaming activities. 62 While the
156. See id. at 424.
157. See id. at 405-06.
158. See id. at 406-07.
159. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 1.
160. Id. at 3.
161. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
162. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 2. IGRA's declaration of congres-
sional policy in § 2702 states one of the statute's purposes:
To provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an
Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other
corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is
conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and play-
ers ....
25 U.S.C. § 2702(2).
The existence and extent of the influence of organized crime in tribal gaming
was a matter of dispute during the legislative development of IGRA and after
its enactment. In its objections to IGRA, the Justice Department expressed
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states attempted to characterize their concern as high-minded
and altruistic by claiming that state jurisdiction over Indian
gambling was necessary to protect against crime, they really
wanted to protect their own economic interests. 63 This distinc-
tion was important for the states because while the states can
collect taxes from gaming on non-Indian lands, they cannot
collect from tribal gaming operations. Congress also stated that
enactment of IGRA recognized the economic competition be-
tween the tribes and the states over gambling enterprises and
that the legislation sought to achieve a "fair balancing" of this
competition.'" If compacting is not allowed to occur, it is
difficult to imagine how this "fair balancing" can be achieved.
B. Early Bills
The first serious legislative attempt to regulate Indian gaming
was the introduction of H.R. 4566 during the 98th Congress in
1983 by Representative Morris Udall, a Democrat from Ari-
the Reagan Administration's view that IGRA was too weak to control criminal
intrusion into Indian gambling. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 28 (reprinting
a letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General). In 1993 the Justice
Department concluded there was no evidence that organized crime had infil-
trated tribal casinos but a report by the Interior Department's Office of
Inspector General alleged criminal activity and exploitation on tribal lands.
Report Urges Controls on Indian Gaming Industry, N.Y. TnvMs, Dec. 19,
1993, at 37. See also James Popkin, Gambling with the Mob?, U.S. NEws &
WoRLD REPORT, Aug. 23, 1993, at 30 (describing testimony of an alleged mob
informant before Congress); Barry M. Horstman & Paul Lieberman, Mafia
Tied to Indian Gaming Takeover Bid, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1992, at Al
(describing indictment of organized crime figures for infiltrating an Indian
casino); Paul Lieberman, How the Mafia Targeted Tribe's Gambling Business,
L.A. TimEs, Oct. 7, 1991, at Al.
163. Two United States Senators stated that the states' primary concern
regarding Indian gambling was economic. Senator John McCain observed:
[I]t [is] clear that the interests of the states and of the gaming
industry extended far beyond their expressed concern about or-
ganized crime. Their true interest was protection of their own
games from a new source of economic competition.... Never
mind the fact that in 15 years of gaming activity on Indian
reservations there has never been one clearly proven case of
organized criminal activity. In spite of these and other reasons,
the State and gaming industry have always come to the table with
the position that what is theirs is theirs and what the Tribe [sic]
have is negotiable.
S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 33 (additional views of Sen. McCain).
Senator John Evans stated: "We should be candid about gambling. This
issue is not one of crime control, morality, or economic fairness.... Indian
tribes may have a competitive economic advantage [which the states seek to
be protected from]." Id. at 36 (additional views of Sen. Evans).
164. Id. at 2.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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zona." 5 This bill was favorable to tribal interests because it
imposed only modest federal regulation and codified the existing
federal case law that minimized state jurisdiction over Indian
gambling.
H.R. 4566 was a response to the Fifth Circuit's 1981 decision
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth,16 a case which
applied the criminal-prohibitory, civil-regulatory distinction to
curtail state regulation of bingo on Indian lands. Under Udall's
bill, unless gaming activity was not specifically banned on Indian
lands by federal law or by a state through criminal law, then it
could be regulated only by the Secretary of the Interior. 167 The
bill required tribal gaming regulations and dictated that they be
at least as restrictive as state laws controlling gaming. 68 Under
Udall's plan, the Secretary would have routinely approved tribal
ordinances which met the conditions of the proposed legisla-
tion. 19
H.R. 4566 had few supporters. It generated discontent from
the Reagan Administration, the states, and the tribes. The bill
died in committee as a consequence. Indian groups were divided
over the bill. One portion of the Indian community supported
it as a clarification of the present status of Indian law, because
the Butterworth decision sharply limited state regulation of
Indian gaming. 7 0 Other Indian groups opposed the legislative
proposal as an unnecessary infringement of tribal sovereignty, 7'
particularly because the tribes already possessed the powers
specified in the bill. 72 The Justice Department complained that
the Department of the Interior lacked sufficient power to prevent
organized crime from infiltrating gaming and that tribes lacked
the ability to be effective regulators. 73 Finally, the Department
of the Interior urged that Indian gaming legislation be delayed
165. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
166. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020
(1982). The Seminole Tribe was the first tribe in the nation to establish a
major bingo operation on a reservation. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 18, at
3072, at 2. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text (discussing state
jurisdiction under Public Law 280); see also Santoni, supra note 154 at 346
(discussing H.R. 4566).
167. H.R. 4566 at § 6(a).
168. Id. § 6(c).
169. Id. § 6(b).
170. Indian Gambling Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 4566 Before the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 96-97
(1984) (statement of Newton Larar, President, National Tribal Chairman's
Association).
171. Id. at 96.
172. Id. at 97-98.
173. Id. at 16-17 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, United States Dept. of Justice).
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untif the various interested parties developed a common regu-
latory approach. 74
In 1985, during the 99th Congress, several legislators intro-
duced bills on Indian gaming. H.R. 1920, introduced by Rep-
resentative Udall, ultimately became the major vehicle for the
99th Congress' consideration of Indian gaming.1 75 In its original
form, H.R. 1920 was little different than H.R. 4566, which
Udall had introduced during the previous Congress.176 H.R. 1920
was reported out of committee and became the principal foun-
dation for IGRA.' 77 Other legislators introduced bills on Indian
gambling during the 99th Congress. Although they were not
reported out of committee, they contained concepts that influ-
enced later debate.
H.R. 2404178 was the other noteworthy bill on Indian gaming
introduced in the House of Representatives during the 99th
Congress. 7 9 H.R. 2404 and H.R. 1920 were similar, but the
latter provided slightly more detailed and defined federal regu-
lation while the former limited Indian gambling by requiring it
to comply with state public policy. 80 The key similarity between
the bills was that they both prevented the extension of direct
174. Id. at 15 (statement of John W. Fritz, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
United States Department of Interior, Indian Affairs).
175. H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See generally Indian Gambling
Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 1920 and H.R. 2404 Before the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) (presenting various
views on H.R. 2040) [hereinafter H.R. 1920 & H.R. 2404 Hearings].
176. H.R. 1920 provided for: "[Flederal standards and regulations for the
conduct of gaming activities on Indian reservations and lands, and for other
purposes." Id.
177. H.R. REP. No. 488, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1 (1986) [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 488].
178. H.R. 2404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Representative Norman D.
Shumway, a California republican, introduced H.R. 2404. The bill was de-
signed "[t]o prohibit gambling activities within Indian country unless such
activities do not violate state law . . ." or are conducted under federal
supervision and are not contrary to state public policy. See H.R. 2404 § 3(e).
H.R. 2404 never made it out of committee.
179. The Reagan Administration introduced S. 2557, which was more limited
in scope than the other proposals, concentrating overwhelmingly on Indian
operated bingo activities. See RIcHARD JoNEs, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV-
ICE, LIERARY OF CONGRESS, GAMBLING ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS - UPDATE
FEBRUARY 17 (1987).
180. Under both bills the Secretary of Interior regulated gaming activity on
Indian lands by approving or disapproving tribal gaming ordinances. H.R.
2404 differed by conditioning approval by the Secretary upon finding that the
particular form of gambling and the manner and extent of the gambling did
not violate the public policy of the state. H.R. 2404, § 4(b)(1). Moreover,
H.R. 2404 would have required the Secretary to consult with the Governor
of the state and to obtain comments on the state's public policy on gambling.
Id. § 4(c).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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state regulatory jurisdiction over tribal lands and instead relied
on tribal and federal regulation.""
The major Senate bill during the 99th Congress was S. 902.182
S. 902 established certain federal standards for Indian gaming
and required the Secretary of Interior to approve tribal gaming
ordinances. 183 The bill required tribal gaming ordinances to be
at least as restrictive as prevailing state law. 84 S. 902 also
permitted regional commissions in each Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) district to regulate and monitor tribal gaming activities. 85
These regional commissions could be organized and established
by the tribes within each BIA district.186
Tribal groups opposed S. 902 because the bill required tribal
regulations to be at least as restrictive as state laws. In other
words, under S. 902, the states would call the shots. The tribes
called this an unprecedented intrusion of state authority on their
sovereignty. 8 Some tribes also opposed the regional commission
approach, primarily because they felt that tribes with gaming
operations would control the commissions and prevent the cre-
ation of additional gaming opportunities by other tribes. 8
181. H.R. 1920 and H.R. 2404 represented extremes of acceptance of and
hostility towards Indian gaming. H.R. 2404's sponsor stated: "My intent is
that whatever state officials have deemed appropriate for gambling within the
state ... [should] be applicable to Indian tribes as well." H.R. 1920 & H.R.
2404 Hearings, supra note 175, at 25 (statement of Rep. Shumway). H.R.
1920 recognized, however, "that the establishment of federal standards for
gaming activities within Indian reservations and on Indian lands is necessary
to meet the concerns which have been raised about such activities and to
protect such activities as a means of generating needed tribal revenues." H.R.
1920 § 3.
182. S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Senator Dennis DeConcini, an
Arizona Democrat, introduced S. 902. See generally Gambling on Indian
Reservations and Lands: Hearings on S. 902 Before the Senate Select Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (presenting various views on
S. 902) [hereinafter S. 902 Hearings].
183. S. 902, § 6(d).
184. Id. § 6(c).
185. Id. § 11.
186. Id. Each commission would have had the "same authority and re-
sponsibility that the Secretary has in the respective area to approve or disap-
prove all tribal gaming ordinances, resolutions, and management contracts,
and otherwise regulate all Indian gaming activities in [the region]." Id. § 11 (c).
187. See, e.g., S. 902 Hearings, supra note 182, at 280-81 (statement of
Douglas L. Bell, Counsel, Tulalip Tribe).
188. Id. at 280 (statement of Douglas L. Bell). The tribes that opposed S.
902's commission approach felt that the commissions could invade dissenting
tribes' sovereignty. These tribes wanted to preserve the "government-to-gov-
ernment relationship that has served as the centerpiece of federal-Indian
relations. . . ." Id. at 283 (prepared statement of the Tulalip Tribes of
Washington, submitted by Stanley G. Jones, Sr., Member Tulalip Board of
Directors).
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The three major legislative proposals of 1985, for one reason
or another, failed to satisfy tribes, states, and gaming companies.
The key point of disagreement was whether and to what extent
the states would play a regulatory role. The states argued that
they should have primary responsibility for gaming for three
reasons.8 9 The states asserted that gaming has a strong effect
on local communities, is susceptible to organized crime, and is
most efficiently regulated by regional authorities, not federal or
tribal authorities.' 90 Tribal authorities staunchly rejected any
state interference, citing the traditional principle that state au-
thority ends at tribal borders. 9' The only outside regulation
tribes would accept was federal.'9 Gaming interests were con-
cerned about the rapid spread of uncontrolled gaming on Indian
land. 93 The gaming industry expressed concern over the pending
federal legislative proposals, which they considered weak. 94
189. S. 902 Hearings, supra note 182 at 107 (statement of Robert Corbin,
Attorney General State of Arizona). Attorney General Corbin argued:
[Congress] should be guided by traditional notions of State re-
sponsibility in areas of State concern rather than short-sighted and
erroneously motivated objectives of permitting Indian country
gambling completely immune from State regulation. Tribal sov-
ereignty and self-government with regard to purely internal, tribal
matters do not have the same force or applicability when large
numbers of non-tribal members are involved. The lure of gambling
free of State control, with all of the attendant evils, is a matter
of clear and urgent concern to the States because of the historical
dangers inherent in such activities.
Id. at 115.
190. Id. at 107-15.
191. See S. 902 Hearings, supra note 182 at 183 (statement of Donald R.
Antone, Sr., Governor of the Gila River Indian Community, Sacaton, Ari-
zona). Mr. Antone remarked that "[t]o refer to state law as a standard against
which tribal law will be measured, turns the current status of the law on its
head." Id. at 185.
192. Id. at 182. The tribes accepted and preferred federal regulation over
state control because the Reagan administration favored tribal self-sufficiency.
Id. at 181.
193. H.R 1920 & H.R. 2404 Hearings, supra note 175 at 140 (statement of
Michael D. Rumbolz, member, State Gaming Congrol Board of Nevada). Mr.
Rumbolz expressed concern that if federal court precedents regarding Indian
gaming were applied to Nevada, tribes could run large casinos without state
control. Id.
194. Id. at 144-48. In particular, Mr. Rumbolz argued that Congress had
underestimated the complexity of needed gaming regulations. Id. at 144. He
also believed that the proposed legislation would codify the civil-regulatory
versus criminal-prohibitory distinction, thus ignoring state prohibitions of
unregulated gambling. Id. at 146. See supra part III.B (explaining this juris-
dictional issue). Mr. Rumbolz also echoed states' concern that gambling on
reservations would create "new havens for organized crime to operate in
disregard of state laws." H.R. 1920 & H.R. 2404 Hearings, supra note 175,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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With little support from any side none of the legislative
proposals of H.R. 1920, H.R. 2404, or S. 902 made it out of
committee in 1985. H.R. 1920 survived the legislative shuffle,
probably because of the influence of its sponsor, Representative
Udall, and substantial changes. In 1986, H.R. 1920 was amended
and reported to the Committee of the Whole House. 95 The
amended bill retitled the legislation from the "Indian Gambling
Control Act" to the "Indian Gaming Regulatory Act" and
contained many of the key elements which were enacted in the
bill's final form in 1988.1'
H.R. 1920" established a National Indian Gaming Commis-
sion to approve of tribal ordinances. For the first time, three
classes of gaming were introduced. 98 The bill gave the tribes
exclusive jurisdiction over Class I gaming. 99 The bill conferred
approval authority upon the Commission for tribal ordinances
regulating Class II gaming,2 which had the effect of giving the
tribes and the federal government concurrent jurisdiction over
this kind of gaming. Tribal gaming ordinances for Class III
gaming were subject to approval by the Commission and these
ordinances had to be identical to the laws used by a state for
the same or similar kinds of gaming activity.20' For both Class
II and Class III gaming, the Indian tribes could not engage in
a gambling activity which the state prohibited as a matter of
public policy or criminal law. 2 2 Additionally, Class II and Class
III gaming on Indian lands were altogether prohibited in Nev-
ada.m
The fiercest debate among the interest groups was over whether
to permit direct state regulation of Class III Indian gaming.
Udall made it clear that he considered the amended H.R. 1920
a compromise, and he was against extending any more jurisdic-
tion or power to the states, other than providing that Commis-
sion regulations would be consistent with the gaming laws the
states themselves used.20
at 148. See also S. 902 Hearings, supra note 182, at 592-95 (statement of
Richard Rolapp, President, American Horse Council) (arguing that states are
better equipped to regulate Indian gaming than the federal government).
195. H.R. Rep. No. 488, supra note 177, at 1.
196. Id. at 1-9.
197. H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., 2d Sess (1986).
198. Id. § 19(5)(A)-(C).
199. Id. § 5.
200. Id. § 11(a)(1).
201. Id. § 11(b)(a)(2).
202. H.R. 1920 § 11(a)(2)(B)(ii).
203. Id.
204. H.R. Rep. No. 488, supra note 177, at 28-29 (supplemented views of
Rep. Udall).
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Gaming interests continued to object to giving authority to
regulate Indian gaming to a national tribal commission on the
grounds that it would be biased toward Indians and would fail
to protect industry interests. 25 As a result, when the bill was
referred to the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 216 it
contained an industry-backed provision for a four-year mora-
torium on any Class III gaming on Indian lands.207 In the
interim, the bill required the Comptroller General to prepare
and submit a report to Congress that studied Class III gaming
and determined whether tribal, state, or federal regulation was
most appropriate. 208
The gaming industry continued to apply its influence to the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs and succeeded in
having its favored provisions on Class III Indian gaming in-
cluded in the version of H.R. 1920 which was reported out by
the Committee.29 This bill, however, dropped the moratorium
in favor of giving states a significant role in determining the
fate of Class III gaming on Indian lands.210 Under the reported
version of H.R' 1920, Class III gaming would be prohibited on
Indian lands unless both the state and the Department of the
Interior approved a transfer of jurisdiction to a tribe which
sought to conduct this kind of gaming.211 The tribes opposed
any legislation that would unilaterally confer state regulatory
authority over gaming activities and preferred an outright ban
on Class III gaming to any direct regulatory jurisdiction given
to the states. 212 Thus, the parties to the Indian gaming contro-
versy remained at odds as they had through the legislative
process.
C. Fear of a Judicial Last Word Spurs Congressional Action
It seemed that significant pressure would be needed to reach
a compromise. That pressure to compromise came from the
federal courts. A concern that federal courts would arbitrate
the future of Indian gaming provoked Congress to begin the
process of developing legislation. Decisions like Butterworth
encouraged a rapid expansion of bingo and other gambling
205. See Santoni, supra note 154, at 400 (detailing efforts of the gaming
industry).
206. H.R. 1920 (Senate version dated April 22, 1986).
207. .Id. § 3(c)(1).
208. Id. § 21(a)(1).
209. See S. REP. No. 493, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1986) [hereinafter S.
Rep. No. 493] (summarizing amendments).
210. Id. at 6.
211. H.R. 1920 § 11(c)(1)-(2)(A) (Senate version dated Sept. 26, 1986).
212. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 4.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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activities on reservations. 21 1 State officials feared that Indian
gaming jeopardized revenues from competing state gambling
activities and called for federal or state regulation of Indian
gaming rather than tribal self-regulation. 2 4 Both gaming interests
and the states objected to the federal courts' criminal-prohibi-
tory, civil-regulatory distinction because it liberated tribal gam-
ing from state regulation. 21 5 In the end, a similar concern for
what the federal courts might do to Indian gaming jelled into
the compromise that became IGRA.
While the Senate was drafting its version of H.R. 1920 in the
spring of 1986,26 the Supreme Court accepted review of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians.21 7 The decision of the Supreme Court to accept
review in Cabazon prompted the various groups concerned about
federal gaming legislation to reassess their positions. 218 Tribal
groups, fearing that the Court would reverse the Ninth Circuit's
protribal decision, became more willing to compromise. 2 9 States
and gaming interests adopted an even tougher position in favor
of transferring jurisdiction over Indian gaming to the states. 220
Despite the tribes' willingness to give ground, the Senate failed
to consider passage of H.R. 1920 before the adjournment of
the Ninety-ninth Congress,2' no doubt because the Senate ver-
sion of H.R. 1920 was too slanted against the Indian tribes.
The Cabazon litigation intensified and congealed the congres-
sional development of IGRA in the 100th Congress. As the
Committee report noted, Congress clearly believed it and not
the federal judiciary should resolve the question of Indian
gaming.222 A little more than a month after the opening of the
213. Over 100 bingo games opened on tribal lands between 1981 when
Butterworth was decided by the Fifth Circuit and 1988 when IGRA was
enacted. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 2.
214. Burr, supra note 44, at 20.
215. The H.R. 1920 reported out of the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs was shaped by state and gaming interests, interjected state regulation
into tribal gaming, and clearly noted that it "[did] not rest on the criminal-
prohibitory, civil-regulatory decision in the law as developed in court decisions
." S. Rep. No. 493, supra note 208, at 2.
216. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 4.
217. The Ninth Circuit, like Butterworth before, adopted the civil-regula-
tory, criminal-prohibitory test and concluded that Public law 280 states like
California lacked jurisdiction to regulate bingo games operated by the Cabazon
Indians. 783 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1986).
218. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 4.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Congress observed that in deciding the Cabazon case the Supreme
Court sought to weigh the interests of states, tribes and the federal government.
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100th Congress and six days before the Supreme Court's decision
in Cabazon, on February 19, 1987, S. 555, which was to become
IGRA, was introduced. 223 S. 555's principal sponsors were Sen-
ators Thomas Daschle, a South Dakota Democrat, Daniel Evans,
a Washington Republican, and Daniel Inouye, a Hawaii Dem-
ocrat . Daschle and Inouye were particularly powerful because
they both served on the Select Committee on Indian Affairs and
because Inouye was its chairman and an influential congressional
figure on Indian matters. Their original version of S. 555 was
in large part the Senate version of H.R. 1920 that was pending
at the end of the Ninety-ninth Congress.2
The Supreme Court's Cabazon decision sparked a flurry of
legislative activity, resulting in a major revision of S. 555 and
the introduction of other bills. In late May 1987, Udall intro-
duced H.R 2057 on the House side.226 A month later, Republican
Senators John McCain, from Arizona, and Daniel Evans, from
Washington, introduced S. 1303,22 which was identical to H.R.
2057.m Although other bills were also introduced,229 the real
competition for enactment was between S. 555 and the House
and Senate companion bills of H.R. 2057 and S. 1303. The
main difference between the two sets of legislative proposals
boiled down to the treatment of Class III gaming.
H.R. 2057 and S. 1303 explicitly stated that Class III gaming
was within the jurisdiction of the Indians tribes, provided the
state allowed similar gaming for any other party.230 These leg-
islative proposals did not require the tribes to consent to state
Id. at 2. Congress was insistent in stating that, "[h]owever, in the final
analysis, it is the responsibility of the Congress... to balance [these interests]
and adjust ... the jurisdictional framework for regulation of gaming on
Indian lands." Id. at 3.
223. S. REP. 446, supra note 3, at 4.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. H.R. 2057, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1987). The bill was jointly intro-
duced with Representatives Young, Campbell, Smith, and Bereuter. S. Rep.
No. 446, supra note 3, at 4.
227. S. 1303, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
228. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (recounting concerns ex-
pressed about the eventually enacted IGRA by Evans and McCain).
229. In early February 1987, several days prior to the Cabazon decision
Representatives Udall and Bereuter introduced H.R. 1079 and Representatives
Coelho, Lujan and Pepper introduced H.R. 964. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note
3, at 4. In November 1987, identical bills were introduced in the Senate and
House, respectively S. 1841 introduced by Senators Hecht and Reid, and H.R.
3605, introduced by Representatives Vacanovich and Bilbray. Id. at 4-5.
230. H.R. 2057, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b). Class II gaming was subject
to similar treatment. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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jurisdiction.23' Udall intended his bill to limit state regulatory
and enforcement authority over Class III gaming by the tribes,
but conceded that the federal regulatory rules for Indian gaming
would have to be consistent with state regulations. 23 2
S. 555 permitted significantly more state intrusion into tribal
gaming authority. S. 555 prohibited Class III gaming on Indian
land unless a tribe consented to state jurisdiction over gaming
activity, which included being subject to state licensing require-
ments and state civil and criminal provisions.2 3 3 S. 555 effectively
transferred jurisdiction from the tribes to the states. Essentially,
S. 555 was an "all or nothing" method for allowing gaming on
Indian land with transfer of jurisdiction to the states as a
condition of allowing Class III gambling.
The tribes clearly favored S. 1303 and H.R. 2507 because
they preferred tribal and federal regulation of gaming to state
regulation and enforcement2 4 The states' position was repre-
sented in a weakly supported bill introduced by Senators Hecht
and Reid which sought to subordinate Indian regulation to state
regulation. 235 Hecht falsely claimed that S. 1303 gave the Indians
nearly exclusive regulatory control.23 6 Reid more candidly ad-
vocated placing all the authority for regulating Indian gaming
in the hands of the states. 7
D. Sudden Appearance of the Compact Provision
In August 1988, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Af-
fairs reached a compromise between S. 555, the pro-state bill,
231. Tribal ordinances regarding Class II and Class III gaming were subject
to approval by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission.
H.R. 2057, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 11(a), 12(a).
232. The regulatory scheme under this version was to flow from the federal
government, not the states, with the federal government acting through the
National Gaming Commission, which would devise rules the tribes would
follow. S. 1303, 100th Cong. Ist Sess. § 12(e)(1)(1987).
233. S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(d). A tribe wishing to engage in
Class III gaming was required to seek transfer of civil and criminal jurisdiction
from itself to the state. The tribe had to obtain approval from the Secretary
of Interior for this transfer. The Secretary acted as the agent for this approval
by seeking and obtaining from a state their consent and then giving Department
of Interior approval.
234. Gambling Activities on Indian reservations and Lands: Hearings on S.
555 and S. 1303 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) [hereinafter S. 555 & S. 1303 hearings] (statement
of Sen. Daniel Inouye, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs).
235. Hecht and Reid sponsored S. 1841. S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at
4.
236. S. 555 & S. 1303 hearings, supra note 234, at 82 (statement of Sen.
Hecht).
237. Id. (statement of Sen. Reid).
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and S. 1303, the protribal bill, and reported out a new version
of S. 555. This new version was enacted as the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act on October 17, 1988.231 After nearly five years
of Congressional haggling over the Indian gaming issue, the
tribal-state compact2 9 appeared for the first time in the amended
S. 555 as a way to resolve the problem of Class III gaming
jurisdiction. The compact allowed the states and tribes to work
out any division of civil, criminal, and regulatory responsibility
for this type of Indian gaming. 2A° Compacting was not intended
to relinquish Indian jurisdiction to the states but was intended
to be a precondition of engaging in tribal gaming. 2A4 The compact
requirement, however, presented an opportunity for state juris-
diction, albeit with the consent of tribal governments. In sum,
Congress "punted" the issue of deciding state versus tribal
jurisdiction to the states and tribes to negotiate amongst them-
selves on a case-by-case basis.
The Senate Indian Affairs Committee considered the tribal-
state compact to be a selective extension of state jurisdiction
onto tribal lands. The Committee admitted, however, that the
compact provision created an "unusual relationship in which a
tribe might affirmatively seek the extension of state jurisdiction
and the application of state laws to activities conducted on
Indian land...,,2A2 although "the extension of State jurisdiction
on Indian lands has traditionally been inimical to Indian inter-
ests." 243 The Committee noted that it is well established that
state laws do not extend to Indian lands, that only Congress
can permit such extension, and that even when it does "allow
a limited application of State law on Iridian lands, Congress has
required the consent of tribal governments....
The Committee report explained that the compact arrangement
was consistent with the principle of Indian sovereignty because
Congress left final regulation to negotiation, rather than unilat-
eral federal decision making.245 In the instance of high-stakes
gaming, the Committee contended that the compact was the
"best mechanism" in which the different concerns and objectives
of the states and tribes could be addressed, balanced, and
satisfied.m Unfortunately, Congress did not contemplate the
238. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988).
239. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1988).
240. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3).
241. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 5-6.
242. Id. at 6.
243. Id. at 6.
244. Id. at 5.
245. Id. at 5-6.
246. S. Rep. No. 446,'supra note 3, at 13.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_u ba law/vol47/iss1/3
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problem that the compact mechanism could neither be the best,
nor a viable, means for any purpose if it was unenforceable.
VI. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, bars suits against a state government by citizens of
another state or citizens of a foreign country,247 and the Court
has included Indian tribes among the foreign governments to
whom this bar applies. 2" The Supreme Court explained that
States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact
and that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this
sovereignty. 2A9
There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity: suits against
state officials, consent, and abrogation. First, under the Supreme
Court's decision in Ex Parte Young, 210 suits are permitted against
state officials acting in their official capacities when they act
unconstitutionally and the suit seeks equitable relief.251 States
have raised the Ex Parte Young doctrine in several compact
suits in which they invoked the sovereign immunity defense . 2
This Article will not examine the Young exception because it
247. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899) (holding suits against a state by
its own citizens are also barred); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
248. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
249. Id. at 782.
250. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
251. Id. at 155, 159. In Ex parte Young, the Court held that a suit
challenging the constitutionality of a state official's actions was not against
the state, and therefore the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the federal
courts from issuing injunctive relief against state officials. Id. at 159.
252. Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1436-37 (10th
Cir. 1994) (rejecting application of Ex Parte Young doctrine and barring suit
against Governor in his official capacity on the grounds that any order to
negotiate a compact would operate against the state itself); Spokane Tribe of
Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the District
Court allowed the tribe to sue the Governor for failure to compact); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1028-29 (lth Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
Ex Parte Young doctrine does not apply to IGRA suits); Sault Ste. Marie
Tribe v. Michigan, 5 F.3d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that after finding
IGRA suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment the district court granted
a motion to name the Governor as a defendant under the Ex Parte Young
doctrine). See also Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccouskee Tribe of Indians,
803 F. Supp 401, 409 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("A well-established Eleventh Amend-
ment fiction requires a party to bring federal suits against a state official
rather than the state itself.").
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has not been a major factor in litigation to enforce IGRA's
compact provision.
Second, a state may consent to suit and in doing so waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. There are two types of consent-
waiver exceptions. The first is express or explicit consent and is
usually manifested through legislative enactment. 23 A state does
not waive its sovereign immunity by merely failing to raise the
defense in the trial court.2 4 None of the courts considering the
question of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars suits to
enforce IGRA's compact provision have found express consent.
The second type of consent is called constructive consent.
This doctrine holds that the states surrendered elements of their
sovereignty when they joined the Union and adopted the Con-
stitution. Constructive consent is also called consent or waiver
from the "plan of convention." The Supreme Court explained,
"States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty,
shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where
there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of
convention."'7 5 The "plan of convention" theory fits into a
larger concept more aptly called "surrender theory."2S6
The leading case for consent inherent in the plan of conven-
tion, and one which figures prominently in the compact cases,
is the Supreme Court decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway.2S7
Parden held that a state implicitly waives its sovereignty if it
enters a field of economic activity that is federally regulated. 258
253. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F.Supp. 550, 554
(S.D. Ala. 1991), aff'd 11 F.3d 1016 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (citing Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959)); see also Clark v. Barnard,
108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883); Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521 (l1th
Cir.) (holding sheriffs immune from suit in a civil rights action because state
law so provided).
254. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 776 F. Supp. at 554 (citing Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974).
255. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) (quoting THW
FEDERALiST No. 81 at 657 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1876)). This
implied waiver of state sovereignty from the plan of convention is found to
exist in two situations. The first is the waiver of immunity against suits by
the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-
41 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 641-46 (1892). The second
type is a waiver of immunity in suits by other states. See, e.g., South Dakota
v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
256. See Letita A. Sears, Comment, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas: Congres-
sional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Under the Commerce Clause,
or, Living with Hans, 58 FoRDInAl L. REv. 513, 517 (1989) (discussing the
history and theory of the Eleventh Amendment).
257. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
258. Id. at 192. In Parden, the Court held that as the owner and operator
of a railroad Alabama may not plead sovereign immunity when it is sued
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Id. at 192. See infra part
VI.B.3 (discussing Parden).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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Parden, however, is without bite because the Supreme Court
has never cited this theory in any subsequent decision.s29 None
of the compact enforcement cases have found the constructive
or implied consent exception to state immunity applicable. 260
Virtually all debate in the compact enforcement cases concerns
the third exception t9 the Eleventh Amendment - the "abro-
gation" of state sovereignty. In certain circumstances Congress
has the power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. The Supreme Court has recognized congressional power
to abrogate when enacting legislation under two constitutional
provisions, the Commerce Clause in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas26 and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in Fi-
tzpatrick v. Bitzer. 2
B. Supreme Court Cases Relevant to IGRA Abrogation-
Hans v. Louisiana, Union Gas, Fitzpatrick, Blatchford, and
Cotton Petroleum
The central dispute between the tribes and states is whether
Congress, in enacting IGRA, in fact abrogated state sovereign
259. The limited effect of Parden is commented upon in one of the IGRA
compact enforcement decisions. See Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1023. Courts
have not read the Parden exception expansively. No Supreme Court decision
except Parden itself has found consent under the Parden theory. The require-
ment that Congress clearly express its intention to condition a state's partici-
pation in federally regulated activities on a forfeiture of sovereign immunity
has been strengthened so that part of Parden already stands overruled. Id.
Seminole Tribe cites as examples of the Court's movement away from
Parden: Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Public Transportation, 483
U.S. 468 (1987) (finding Parden inapplicable in a seaman's suit against a
state); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (declining to
apply Parden to all federally funded programs); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (finding Parden inapplicable to a federally funded program);
Employees of Dept. of Public Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279
(1973) (declining to apply Parden to public hospitals). The court in Poarch
contended that Welch partially overruled Parden by requiring that Congres-
sional intent to subject states to suits must be "unmistakably clear" in the
language of the statute. 776 F. Supp. at 557 (citing Welch, 483 U.S. at 478).
See infra notes 364-67 and accompanying text (discussing this "clear expres-
sion" test).
260. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe 11 F.3d at 1022-23 (rejecting the tribe's
argument that Florida implicitly waived its immunity inherently in the plan of
convention or constructively by acceptance of the benefits of IGRA).
261. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (abrogating states' immunity from money damages
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA)). See infra part VI.B.5.
262. 427 U.S. 445 (abrogating states' immunity from money damages under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972). See infra part VI.B.4.
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immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The tribes assert that
the Indian Commerce Clause, under which IGRA was enacted,
provides Congress the power to abrogate state immunity.263 The
Supreme Court has never held that the Indian Commerce Clause
provides a basis for congressional abrogation. Thus, the lower
courts have been left to determine whether congressional power
to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause is equal to the
power to abrogate under the Interstate Commerce Clause and
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 264 In their search
for an answer to this question, courts have consulted several
Supreme Court decisions.
1. Centrality of Union Gas and Relevance of Surrender
Theory
Because the Supreme Court has held that the states did not
consent to suits by Indian tribes in the plan of the convention ,265
courts must determine whether Congress nevertheless has the
power to abrogate state immunity. Union Gas has confused
courts as to the role of the "surrender theory" in determining
whether states have lost their sovereign immunity under IGRA.
Regardless of whether surrender theory has been used to deter-
mine the application of constructive consent or abrogation ex-
ceptions, those courts that hold states immune from an IGRA
suit believe Union Gas rests on surrender theory.26 The courts
that hold the Eleventh Amendment defense unavailable to the
states regard Union Gas as resting not on surrender theory, but
on Congress' plenary power to enact legislation pursuant to the
commerce clause.267
2. Hans v. Louisiana - The Genesis of Surrender Theory
The Supreme Court has largely abandoned constructive con-
sent as a basis for the Eleventh Amendment defense. 26 Thus,
263. See, e.g., Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1429; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at
995; Seminole Tribe 11 F.3d at 1025; Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd on
other grounds Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 5
F.3d 147; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Mississippi, No. CIV.A.J.90-
0386(B), 1991 WL 255614 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 1991).
264. See infra part VII (discussing federal courts' attempts to resolve this
issue).
265. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782. See also infra part VI.B.6.
266. See Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1027-28.
267. See Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1430; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 996;
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280 (8th Cir. 1993).
268. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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any confusion over whether surrender theory in the form of the
"plan of convention" doctrine is the basis for constructive
consent or for congressional abrogation is not justified. The
confusion over whether surrender theory or plenary power theory
is the basis for Union Gas, however, is appropriate. Further-
more, Union Gas and other Supreme Court decisions are not
clear on whether the congressional abrogation authority, which
Union Gas determined existed under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, can be extended to apply to the Indian Commerce
Clause, under which IGRA was enacted.
The surrender theory arose from Hans v. Louisiana,269 the
Supreme Court's landmark 1890 Eleventh Amendment decision.
The Court found Louisiana immune from suit in federal court
by one of its citizens seeking to collect on Civil War bonds, 270
even though the text of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits only
suits by noncitizens. 27' The Court determined that state immunity
was not restricted by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment but
was "inherent in the nature of [state] sovereignty" that existed
at the time the Constitution was ratified. 272 As the Court later
noted, state immunity comes not from the words of the Con-
stitution, but is inherent in the constitutional plan. 273
Hans went beyond the literal meaning and interpreted the
Eleventh Amendment in a manner which the Court regarded as
consistent with the constitutional plan.274 The decision that state
immunity rests upon the constitutional plan is the basis for
judicial acceptance of surrender theory and gave substance to a
variant theory which was later mentioned in Union Gas as the
"plan of convention" theory. Under this theory, states are
deemed to have surrendered some of their sovereignty when they
ratified the Constitution. Surrender theory is a form of consent
in which the states relinquished their sovereignty when accepting
the Constitution. 275 This harks back to the understanding of
269. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
270. Id. at 10.
271. Id. at 21. The Eleventh Amendment, by its own terms, only prohibits
suits in federal courts by "Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
272. Hans, 377 U.S. at 13.
273. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. at 322-23.
274. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
275. Monaco 292 U.S. at 313, 329. The Court determined the jurisdiction
of the federal courts over the states was inherent in the Constitutional plan.
Id. Monaco declared that the states agreed to federal court jurisdiction for
the purpose of preserving "the permanence of the Union." Id. at 320 (citing
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892)). The Court has held that
states agreed to jurisdiction in federal tribunals in suits against each other in
order to preserve the peace of the Union. South Dakota v. North Carolina,
192 U.S. 286, 313-16 (1904).
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state sovereignty Alexander Hamilton expressed in The Feder-
alist. Union Gas quotes Hamilton in stating, "we have recog-
nized that the States enjoy no immunity where there has been
'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of convention.' ' 276
The Supreme Court relied on this principle to allow the states
to be sued in federal court by the United States and by other
states. 277 Relying on the same reasoning, the Court determined
that foreign nations cannot sue states in federal court because
foreign nations were not included in the political framework of
the Constitution.278
3. The Rise and Fall of Parden
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court used the doctrine of
constructive consent to permit federal court review of federal
question cases against the states. 279 The apex in Supreme Court
development of the constructive consent doctrine was the 1964
decision of Parden v. Terminal Railway.2s0
The majority opinion in Parden, written by Justice Brennan,
the author of the plurality opinion in Union Gas, held that an
employee of a state owned and operated railroad could sue
Alabama in federal court to recover for personal injuries under
the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) even though such
state-owned railroads were not expressly mentioned in the stat-
ute.28' The Court stated that FELA was enacted pursuant to
Congress' power to regulate commerce under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. 2s2 The Court determined that Alabama had
consented to suit under FELA by operating a railroad in inter-
state commerce, thus surrendering its immunity to suit by en-
gaging in a properly regulated activity. 283 Brennan's surrender
theory proposed that in ratifying the Constitution, the states
submitted to federal regulation pursuant to enumerated Con-
gressional powers. 2 4
276. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 322-23 (1934) (quoting Tm FEDERALIST No. 81, at 657 (Alexander
Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1876)).
277. Id. at 20.
278. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 231-32.
279. Donald L. Boren, Congressional Power to Grant Federal Courts Ju-
risdiction Over States: The Impact of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 24 AKRON
L. REv. 9, 15 (1990).
280. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
281. Id. at 186.
282. Id. at 190-91.
283. Id. at 191 ("The States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty
when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.").
284. Id. at 192 ("The States necessarily surrendered any portion of their
sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation.").https://ope scholarship.w stl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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Parden's holding could be read to mean that Congress abro-
gates state immunity when it legislates pursuant to the commerce
clause. Instead, however, Parden is commonly understood to
represent the implied waiver theory of consent. 25 The Parden
doctrine of constructive waiver appears to have been either
overruled2" or discarded.2 7 No other Supreme Court decision
holds that state participation in a federal program enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause implies a waiver of state
Eleventh Amendment Immunity. A series of Supreme Court
decisions beginning in 1973 seemed to reject constructive consent
by not accepting mere participation in a federally regulated
activity as the only condition to constructive consent. 22s Those
opinions insisted that the legislation also adhere to the clear
statement rule to such a stringent degree that constructive con-
sent was nearly impossible to achieve. 289
4. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer - Abrogation under the Fourteenth
Amendment
In 1975, the Court, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,290 recognized a
constitutional provision as the basis for congressional abrogation
285. See Catherine Goldberg, Comment, Abrogation. of State Sovereign
Immunity Under CERCLA, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1075, 1089 (stating
that Parden turned on waiver) (citing Employees of the Dept. of Pub. Health
and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 282
(1973)).
286. Boren, supra note 279 at 15 & n.39 (asserting that Welch v. Texas
Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987), overruled Parden).
287. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp.
1484, 1487 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 653
("Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the sur-
render of constitutional rights and we see no place for it here.")).
288. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 478 (1987) ("[To the extent that Parden ... is inconsistent with the
requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress
must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled."); see also
Poarch, 776 F. Supp. at 556 ("The requirement that Congress' intention to
condition a state's participation in federally regulated activities on a forfeiture
of sovereign immunity be clearly expressed has been strengthened so that
already part of Parden stands overruled.").
In Welch the Court held that Texas could raise the defense of sovereign
immunity to a tort suit for personal injuries suffered by an employee of the
Texas Highway Department. The employee sued Texas in federal court under
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988), which extends FELA to seamen who
suffer injury in the course of employment and provides for federal court
jurisdiction. Welch, 483 U.S. at 471. See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Public Health Department, 411 U.S. 279,
285 (1973).
289. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 ("In subsequent cases the Court consistently
has required an unequivocal expression that Congress intended to override
Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
290. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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for the first time.291 Fitzpatrick can be understood in two ways.
On the one hand, the holding relied on the surrender theory to
the extent that it held states subject to suit in federal courts in
instances provided for in the Constitution, such as the enforce-
ment provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 2 On the other
hand, in Fitzpatrick, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
might also be seen as bowing to Congress' plenary power to
legislate to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
guarantees.
29
In Fitzpatrick the Court embraced the Fourteenth Amendment
as a unique limitation on state power, which circumscribes state
authority and empowers Congress to do all that is necessary
and proper to implement its provisions.294 The Court held that
the grant of power in the Fourteenth Amendment limits other
parts of the Constitution in order to achieve the Amendment's
purposes.
291
In Fitzpatrick, the Court distinguished abrogation from
waiver. 296 Abrogation is based on Congressional power and not
consent. Surrender of state power, which is so crucial to con-
structive consent, 297 was not the justification the Court used in
Fitzpatrick. The Court instead adopted a plenary power theory
by describing the Fourteenth Amendment as a significant limi-
tation upon state power. 298 Under this theory, state power must
291. It also presaged the Court's eventually permitting abrogation under
the Commerce Clause. In his concurring opinion in Fitzpatrick, Justice Stevens
declared he believed Congress had the power to abrogate under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring). He believed the Court should
have considered the issue of whether Congress had power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the states by enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 under the Commerce Clause and not the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. See also Welch 483 U.S. at 475 ("We assume, without deciding or
intimating a view of the question, that the authority of Congress to subject
unconsenting states to suit in federal court is not confined to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
292. The Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
293. Goldberg, supra, note 285, at 1092.
294. 427 U.S. at 456. The Court explained that § 5 provides Congress the
power to legislate in order to enforce limitations on state power contained
elsewhere in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
295. Id. at 456.
296. Id. at 451-52.
297. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-93 (describing the theory of constructive
consent, whereby states are deemed to have surrendered Eleventh Amendment
immunity by engaging in certain specified activities).
298. 427 U.S. at 456 ("[Tlhe Eleventh Amendment and the principle of
state sovereign immunity ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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give way to superseding federal power. The Court held that the
grant of authority to Congress in the Fourteenth Amendment
limits other parts of the Constitution in order to fulfill the
Amendment's purposes. The Court in Fitzpatrick balanced state
interests represented by the Eleventh Amendment with the fed-
eral interest in the supremacy of federal law. 29
The plan of convention theory has less relevance for abro-
gation under the Fourteenth Amendment since this amendment
can be justified by the "later in time" argument.3°° Unlike the
Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified after
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court's treatment of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Fitzpatrick benefited from the general
rule of construction that if two legal instruments of equal
authority conflict, the one more recently enacted prevails 0 1
Because the Fourteenth Amendment came later in time than the
Eleventh Amendment it is easier to characterize the former as
a grant of power to the federal government which is carved out
at the expense of any previously existing state power.30 2
5. Union Gas - A Messy Decision
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas °3 the Supreme Court held that
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
299. Id. at 454-55. The Court stated:
Such enforcement [of the fourteenth amendment] is no invasion
of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the
States have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered
Congress to enact .... [In exercising her rights, a State cannot
disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution applied
to her power. Her rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can she
deny to the general government the right to exercise all its granted
powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of
rights she would have if those powers had not been thus granted.
Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves
a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the
States. It is carved out of them.
Id. (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).
This role can be likened to a supremacy clause argument. Id. The Supremacy
Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the Land
... ." U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
300. Jesse M. Feder, Note, Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign
Immunity, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1436, 1442 (1986).
301. This legal argument is based on the premise that whoever enacted the
latter legislation was aware of the earlier law and intended the later one to
supplant the earlier one. Id.
302. See, e.g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (describing the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to the sovereignty of states within
the context of federalism).
303. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
96 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 47:51
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)3°4 permits a private party to
sue a state for damages in federal court. 05 The Court held that
the Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to enact
CERCLA and create a cause of action in federal court that
would supersede a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.3°6
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Union Gas'07 held that
Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment im-
munity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.10
The opinion is a model of internal inconsistency and contradic-
tion, using consent, surrender theory, plan of convention theory,
and plenary power theory to reach its conclusion.? 9
304. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
305. See generally Goldberg, supra note 285 (describing in detail the Union
Gas decision).
306. 491 U.S. at 20. The case involved a suit by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) against Union Gas for reimbursement of environmental
clean up costs. Id. at 5. Union Gas' predecessor operated a coal gasification
plant, which had been dismantled in 1950. Id. Coal tar at the site began to
seep into a creek in 1980, shortly after the State of Pennsylvania struck a
large deposit of coal tar while excavating the creek. Id. EPA declared that
the coal tar was a hazardous substance, cleaned up the site, and sued Union
Gas to recoup its costs under CERCLA. Id. at 6. Union Gas filed a third
party complaint against the State of Pennsylvania, asserting it was liable as
an "owner and operator" of the site under CERCLA. Id. A section of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1988) excludes a state government from
general liability but allowed liability for gross negligence or intentional mis-
conduct. The district court dismissed the third-party complaint, holding the
state could not be sued as a result of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983). After
remand in light of the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the Third Circuit found
that Congress clearly intended to hold states liable for money damages and
that Congress had power to do so under the Commerce Clause. United States
v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d. Cir. 1986).
307. On the question of whether Congress can abrogate state immunity
when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Justice Brennan delivered
an opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmum, and Stevens. 491 U.S. at
5. While the various opinions in Union Gas appear to reach no concrete
conclusions, five justices agreed that Congress had the authority to abrogate
states' immunity under the Commerce Clause. Four votes came from those
joining Justice Brennan's opinion, and a fifth from Justice White, who
grudgingly joined the relevant part of the plurality opinion: "I agree with the
conclusion ... that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states, but I do not agree with
much of [Brennan's] reasoning." 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J., concurring in
part in the judgement).
308. 491 U.S. at 23. Brennan reasoned that congressional authority to
abrogate stemmed from "the special nature of the power conferred by [the
Commerce Clause]." Id. at 19.
309. The use of so many varied theories led Justice Scalia, who wrote the
dissent, to criticize the majority for creating confusion, rather than "cleaning
up the allegedly muddled Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence." Union Gas,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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The plurality maintained that Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce gave Congress the power to abrogate state
Eleventh Amendment Immunity.310 The plurality maintained that
the Commerce Clause alters the balance of state and federal
power established by the Constitution and determining the scope
Eleventh Amendment immunity.31' The plurality also regarded
the Commerce Clause as conferring special plenary power on
Congress that expands federal power at the expense of state
power. 312 By giving Congress the authority to regulate commerce,
the plurality concluded, the states surrendered a portion of their
sovereignty.31 1
491 U.S. at 44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In addition to being inconsistent, Union Gas is also a sharply divided
decision. Apart from the plurality opinion, Justice Stevens filed a concurrence
which emphasized the Court's responsibility to uphold congressional decisions
to subject states to liability under federal law. 491 U.S. at 28-29 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice White also filed a concurring opinion. However, he
disagreed with Brennan's reasoning, espousing the position that Congress must
use "unmistakable language" in order to abrogate immunity. Id. at 50 (White,
J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). Justice O'Connor also joined Part I of Justice White's concurrence. Id.
at 57.
310. The plurality held the authority of Congress to regulate commerce
under the Interstate Commerce Clause includes the authority to abrogate state
immunity from suit. 491 U.S. at 14. Through an analogy to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the plurality reasoned that the congressional Commerce Clause
power includes the ability to limit the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 16-17.
Specifically, because the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
both simultaneously give power to the federal government while taking power
from the states, the Commerce Clause limits the principles of federalism
established by the Constitution under which the Eleventh Amendment is
interpreted. Hence, the Commerce Clause confers special plenary power on
Congress that expands federal power at the expense of state power. Id. at 14-
17.
311. 491 U.S. at 16-19. Justice Scalia argued that Fitzpatrick's rationale did
not apply to the Commerce Clause because the Fourteenth Amendment was
a subsequent limit on state power. Id. at 41-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The plurality responded that Justice Scalia's opinion
failed to recognize that the Eleventh Amendment was an embodiment of
principles that already existed in the Constitution. Id. at 17-19.
312. Id. at 16. The plurality emphasized the effect of the commerce power
to displace state authority. This effect, the plurality noted, is where congres-
sional power really lies. Id. at 20.
313. Justice Scalia wrote a four-vote dissent which disagreed with the
plurality's analogy to the Fourteenth Amendment and argued that Congress
only has authority to override state immunity when legislating pursuant to
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 491 U.S. at 29 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent argued that the Eleventh
Amendment is a constitutional limitation upon the power of the federal courts,
not a statement limiting state sovereign immunity. Id. at 31. The dissent also
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Brennan relied upon dicta from the majority opinion he
authored in Parden to infer state consent in Pennsylvania's
ratification of the Constitution. 3 4 Consent, as borrowed from
Parden, was phrased in terms of surrender theory.35 The plu-
rality in turn associated surrender of immunity with plan of
convention.31 6 Thus, one of the seeming sources for the holding
was that the states waived their immunity under the "plan of
convention."
Using the consent theory from Parden, the Union Gas plu-
rality blurred the separate theories of abrogation and consent.
Union Gas made consent, at least under the plan of convention,
the basis for subjecting a state to a congressional abrogation of
immunity. In Union Gas, the Court held that congressional
action could abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit where congressional intent was clear and where the
abrogation occurred through the exercise of Congress' consti-
tutional authority to regulate commerce which the states pur-
portedly had impliedly consented to "in the plan of the
[constitutional] convention. ' 317 Thus, Union Gas might stand
for the proposition that state sovereignty cannot be used to
prohibit Congress from regulating interstate commerce because
the states consented to this power by adopting the Constitu-
tion.318
A number of baffling anomalies result from the Union Gas
reliance on Parden. First, the Court had seemingly abandoned
used a slippery slope argument, claiming that if other Article I powers could
be used to abrogate the limited grant of judicial jurisdiction then Article III
powers would be expanded. That, the dissent claimed, "is not the regime the
Constitution establishes." Id. at 40.
314. 491 U.S. at 14.
[W]e concluded that "the States surrendered a portion of their
sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate
commerce," and that "[b]y empowering Congress to regulate
commerce ..... the States necessarily surrendered any portion of
their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regula-
tion. . . ." Although it is true that we have referred to Parden as
a case involving a waiver of immunity, the statements quoted
above lay a firm foundation for the argument that Congress'
authority to regulate commerce includes the authority directly to
abrogate States' immunity from suit.
Id. (citations omitted).
315. Id. (quoting Parden, 377 U.S. at 192).
316. "We have recognized that the States enjoy no immunity where there
has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of convention." Union
Gas, 491 U.S. at 19 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1934)).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 19-20.https://openschol rship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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constructive consent after Parden. Second, abrogation and waiver
are incomparable and independent bases for removing Eleventh
Amendment immunity, because Fitzpatrick appears to reflect
the view that the former is based on congressional power and
not consent of the states to be subject to lawsuits. Finally, the
bases for consent Brennan found in Parden and in Union Gas
were entirely different. Parden was based on a waiver of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity and not on congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. In Parden, the Brennan majority
opinion premised state consent on participation in a federally
regulated activity which occurred after the enactment of federal
legislation. In Union Gas the Brennan plurality opinion inferred
state consent in its ratification, via plan of convention, of the
Constitution two hundred years earlier.
The plurality opinion in Union Gas also applied to the Com-
merce Clause the same plenary power reasoning the Court had
used to support abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment
in Fitzpatrick.3 9 Brennan found that the Commerce Clause, like
the Fourteenth Amendment, is a plenary power which "both
expands federal power and contracts state power."320 The plu-
rality opinion noted that, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Commerce Clause gives power to Congress while it takes power
away from the states.321
Justice Scalia's dissent exclaimed that the Commerce Clause
is not a limitation on state power in the same way as the
Fourteenth Amendment.32 Scalia's dissent argued that abroga-
tion in the Fourteenth Amendment context was different than
abrogation under Article I because the Fourteenth Amendment,
unlike the original Constitution, postdates the Eleventh Amend-
ment. 323
Brennan sought to trump Scalia's later in time argument by
adopting Scalia's chronological approach to make an argument
for preratification existence of sovereign immunity. Brennan
319. Brennan analogized the two provisions and found sufficient similarities
to justify treating the two powers the same for Eleventh Amendment abro-
gation purposes. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 16.
320. Id. at 17.
321. Id. at 16.
322. 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia J., dissenting). Scalia stated:
An interpretation of the original Constitution which permits Con-
gress to eliminate sovereign immunity only if it wants to renders
the doctrine a practical nullity and it is therefore unreasonable.
The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was avowedly
directed against the power of the States, and permits abrogation
of their sovereign immunity only for a limited purpose.
Id.
323. Id. at 41-42.
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noted that since the doctrine of state sovereign immunity pre-
dated the Constitution, all Article I powers, just like the Four-
teenth Amendment, postdate, and therefore limit, sovereign
immunity. 32
Brennan presented a "surrender theory" which operated on
the principle that states agreed to be subject to regulation
adopted by Congress pursuant to its enumerated constitutional
powers. 32 Brennan ignored the later in time argument because
both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment are
enumerated congressional powers carved out of a surrender of
state sovereignty.3 26
6. Complicating Union Gas - Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak
Complicating the debate over whether IGRA abrogates state
immunity from suit is the Supreme Court decision two years
after Union Gas in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak.3 27
In Blatchford, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment protects states from suits by Indian tribes in federal court
for breaches of state statutes. 328 The Court reversed a Ninth
Circuit decision holding that the Commerce Clause furnished
jurisdiction to the federal courts over all Indian matters.3 29
Blatchford makes clear that consent-waiver and abrogation are
two separate and distinct lines of inquiry, even though both
324. 491 U.S. at 17 ("It is not the Commerce Clause that came first, but
'the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment' that did so.").
325. Id. at 19-20 ("To the extent that the States gave Congress authority
to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress
found it necessary ... to render them liable."). Id. at 20.
326. Brennan expressed this type of thinking in his concurring opinion in
Fitzpatrick: "Congressional" authority to enact the provisions of Title VII at
issue in this case is found in the Commerce Clause, Art. I. § 8, cl. 3 and in
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, two of the enumerated powers granted
Congress in the Constitution." 427 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J. concurring)
(emphasis added).
327. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
328. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 788. The Native Village of Noatak sued the
Commissioner of Alaska's Department of Community and Regional Affairs
for including non-native communities in a revenue-sharing program which the
legislature authorized for Eskimo communities. Id. at 778. By expanding the
class of communities eligible to receive the state aid, the Commissioner's action
reduced the aid available to Eskimo communities. Id. The Village sued the
Commissioner in federal court, claiming that the state failed to provide the
funds authorized by the state legislature. Id.
329. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1990).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
IGRA AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
might be based upon plan of convention or surrender theory.330
The Court also left open the question of whether Congress has
the power to abrogate state immunity under the Indian Com-
merce Clause.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the states, in accepting the
Commerce Clause, surrendered their sovereign immunity to suits
regarding all relatioqs with nonforeign governments, including
Indian tribes. 33' The court held that abrogation was unnecessary
because states' consent to suit by the tribes was inherent in the
plan of the constitution.332 Because the tribes were present in
the United States prior to ratification of the Constitution, the
Ninth Circuit stated the new union had to allocate government
power in relations with the Indians. 333 The Ninth Circuit stated
that after adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became
the exclusive province of the federal government. 334 In ratifying
the Constitution, the states not only surrendered control to
federal government, but also surrendered immunity from suit.3 35
The Ninth Circuit concluded that, within this framework, the
federal statute granting federal court jurisdiction over Indian
affairs was sufficient to grant federal court jurisdiction over
suits against states .336
The Supreme Court, relying upon the plan of convention
theory which served as one of the rationales for Union Gas,
determined the Eleventh Amendment prevents tribes from suing
the states for damages pursuant to state law. 337 However, while
Union Gas was about congressional power to abrogate, Blatch-
ford was about waiver of immunity. The Blatchford Court did
not specifically address whether its decision would be the same
if Congress was enacting legislation pursuant to the Indian
330. Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1431 (10th
Cir. 1994) ("The Blatchford Court's historical analysis about waiver in no
way undermines Union Gas, which only considered Congress' abrogation
powers ... [Blatchford] demonstrates that the historical analysis of waiver
does not undermine the conclusion that Congress may abrogate ... pursuant
to its Article I plenary powers.").
331. Hoffman, 896 F.2d at 1164.
332. Id. at 1164 (keasoning that states retain no immunity from suit by
tribes because any such immunity was rendered non-existent by the states'
consent to the Constitution).
333. Id. at 1162.
334. Id. at 1163.
335. Id. at 1162.
336. Hoffman, 896 F.2d at 1160.
337. 501 U.S. at 782. The Supreme Court has affirmed the right of Indian
tribes to sue for injunctive and prospective relief to enforce treaty rights in
federal court. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
465 (1976).
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Commerce Clause. In Blatchford, the Court considered both
abrogation and constructive consent and clarified that consent-
waiver and abrogation are distinctly different bases for removing
the Eleventh Amendment immunity bar. 38
On the question of the waiver of sovereign immunity, the
tribes argued that sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment limits suits by individuals against sovereigns rather
than suits by sovereigns against sovereigns. 3 9 Relying upon its
1934 decision in Monaco v. Mississippi,340 the Supreme Court
held that a state's sovereign immunity extended to both indivi-
dUals and sovereigns and that a state's surrender of immunity
is determined by the plan of convention. 341 The Court found
nothing to suggest that a surrender of immunity among states
and tribes was inherent in the plan of convention.3 42
The Supreme Court found it inconsistent that the states would
surrender their immunity to the Indians without a mutual con-
cession from the Indian tribes.343 The Court differentiated the
application of the plan of convention for the states from its
application to the tribes.344 The states ceded some aspects of
their sovereign immunity to the federal government, but they
did not give up their sovereign immunity against entities other
than the United States and sister states. 345 In ratifying the
Constitution the states made a mutual concession to be sued by
other states a.34 No such mutuality of concession existed, however,
for removal of immunity between the states and the Indian
tribes.3 47 The Court concluded the states could not have made
such a mutual concession with Indians because Indians were not
part of the Constitutional Convention.3 48 Blatchford is based on
the principle that the tribes could not surrender their immunity
in a convention to which they were not parties. Therefore, if
338. Id. at 785 (differentiating between the abrogation of state sovereignty
and the delegation to tribes of a federal government exemption from state
sovereign immunity).
339. Id. at 779-80.
340. 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (holding that, in suit by a foreign nation to recover
funds due under bonds from state, states shall be immune from suit unless
they surrender immunity in the plan of the convention).
341. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 780-81 (concluding that traditional principles
of sovereignty restrict both suits by individuals and those by sovereigns).
342. Id. at 779.
343. Id. at 782.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 781.
346. Id. at 782.
347. Id.
348. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
IGRA AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
the convention did not surrender the tribes' immunity to the
states, it could not surrender the states' immunity to the tribes. 49
Blatchford separately discussed abrogation.3 -0 The Court found
that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 did not satisfy the clear statement test3 51
because it failed to reflect, in unmistakably clear language, a
congressional intent to abrogate the defense of state immunity
from suit in federal court.3 2 Thus, the Court held that § 1362,
which granted the federal courts the power to hear suits on
Indian matters, did not abrogate the states' immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.3 53 Because the Court found that Congress
did not intend § 1362 to abrogate, the Court never reached the
issue of congressional authority to abrogate.
7. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico - Comparing
the Two Commerce Clauses
In Union Gas, the Supreme Court spoke of the Congressional
power to abrogate under the "Commerce Clause," but failed
to distinguish between the Interstate Commerce Clause and the
Indian Commerce Clause. It is clear, however, that the Court's
decision pertained to regulating interstate commerce, making the
Interstate Commerce Clause the portion of the Commerce Clause
relevant to their decision. Part of the debate over abrogation
under IGRA is whether the congressional power to abrogate is
different for the two pieces of the Commerce Clause. Extending
Union Gas to Indian Commerce requires courts to find con-
gressional authority to abrogate under the Indian Commerce
Clause equal to that under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
The courts in IGRA sovereign immunity cases have used the
Supreme Court's decision in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico35 4 in evaluating whether congressional power under each
of the two clauses is different. States have argued that Cotton
349. The Court stated that Indian tribes were immune from suits by the
states and that "if the convention could not surrender the tribes' immunity
for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surrendered the States'
immunity for the benefit of the tribes." 501 U.S. at 782.
350. Id. at 787.
351. See infra notes 364-67 and accompanying text.
352. 501 U.S. at 787.
353. Id.
354. 490 U.S. 163 (1989). Cotton Petroleum, a non-Indian company, leased
reservation lands having oil and gas wells. 490 U.S. at 168. The company
paid severance taxes to both the tribe and the State of New Mexico. Id. The
company argued that the state and tribal taxes constituted an unlawful multiple
burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 187-88. Under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, when more than one state seeks to tax the same activity from which
a business receives income from several states, an apportionment formula
must be used so that a state taxes only the activities conducted within its
borders. Id. at 188.
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Petroleum is authority for the proposition that Congress has no
power to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause. 5 One
court cited the Supreme Court's statement that while the purpose
of the Interstate Commerce Clause is to limit state power to
ensure free trade, "the central function of the Indian Commerce
Clause is to provide Congress plenary power to legislate in the
field of Indian Affairs" as precedent to limit Union Gas to
Interstate Commerce.356
Cotton Petroleum involved facts and legal issues clearly dis-
tinguishable from the IGRA abrogation cases. Therefore, most
courts have properly found it inapplicable.35 7 The question pre-
sented in Cotton Petroleum was whether tribes should be treated
like states for the purpose of deciding if a state tax on nontribal
activities conducted on tribal lands should be apportioned to
offset taxes imposed upon the same activity by the tribal gov-
ernment.3 58 The Court held that the tribes were not like the
states for Commerce Clause purposes. 59 While the Court re-
marked that the two Commerce Clauses had "different appli-
cations," the Court did not differentiate the clauses with respect
to congressional abrogation power. Furthermore, despite this
seeming distinction, the Court again emphasized that "plenary
power" is the basis of Congressional exercise of the Indian
Commerce Clause.
VII. FEDERAL CASE LAW ON IGRA ABROGATION
The central dispute between the tribes and the states is whether
Congress, in enacting IGRA, in fact abrogated state sovereignty
under the Eleventh Amendment. Federal courts have applied a
two-step test to resolve this dispute. First, did Congress intend
to abrogate state sovereignty through IGRA? Second, did Con-
gress possess the constitutional power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity in IGRA?
The tribes assert that the Indian Commerce Clause, under
which IGRA was enacted, provides the necessary abrogation
355. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1027 (stating that Cotton Petro-
leum describes the central functions of each clause differently, thus mandating
different treatment for each clause in abrogation cases).
356. Id. (quoting Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192).
357. See Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1431 (10th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that Cotton Petroleum is not dispositive because "[t]he
obvious differences between two clauses ... do not lead us to conclude that
Congress lacks the power to abrogate.., under the Indian Commerce Clause);
Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 995 ("The Court's holding in Cotton Petroleum
... is inapplicable.") (citations omitted).
358. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191.
359. Id. at 191-93.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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power. The Supreme Court, however, has never ruled that the
Indian Commerce Clause provides a basis for congressional
abrogation. To date, the Court has decided only that the Inter-
state Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment provide the basis for abrogation. IGRA raises the
issue of whether Congress also has power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.
The federal circuits are split on whether IGRA erases Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Tenth Circuit in Ponca Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Oklahoma,3w° the Ninth Circuit in Spokane Tribe
of Indians v. Washington,361 and the Eighth Circuit in Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota6 2 hold that IGRA abrogates
state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit in Seminole Tribe
v. Florida,a36 concludes that Congress lacked the authority to
abrogate state immunity when it enacted IGRA. Not unexpect-
edly, the circuit courts that provide reasoning in finding abro-
gation have embraced plenary power theory as the basis for
their rulings and the circuit that rejects abrogation has empha-
sized surrender theory as its governing philosophy.
A. Intent to Abrogate
When Congress enacted IGRA, it intended to abrogate state
immunity. To abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment im-
munity Congress must unequivocally express its intent36 or be
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.''365 It is not
360. 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'g Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Oklahoma, 834 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Okla. 1992), Pueblo of Sandia v. King,
No. CIV-92-613 JC, 1992 WL 540817 (D.N.M. Nov. 3, 1992), and Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, slip op. No. CIV-92-076 JC (D.N.M. 1992);
aff'g Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 1423 (D. Kan. 1993).
361. 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994).
362. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
363. 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir.) rev'g Seminole Tribe v. Florida 801 F. Supp.
655 (S.D. Fla. 1992); aff'g Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776
F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Alabama 1991). IGRA has been held not to abrogate state
immunity in two district court decisions in other circuits. See Sault Ste. Marie
Tribe v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.Mich) 1992); Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Mississippi, No. CIV.A J90-0386(B), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19397 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 1991). The Michigan federal district court
which decided Sault Ste. Marie is contained in the Sixth Circuit and the
Mississippi federal district court which decided Choctaw is located in the Fifth
Circuit.
364. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) ("[E]vidence of congres-
sional intent must be both unequivocal and textual.").
365. Id. at 228 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 242 (1985)); Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 775 ("[C]ases require Congress's
exercise of the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity ... to be exercised
with unmistakable clarity."). This standard is known as the "clear statement
rule." See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 110 n.439 (1988).
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enough that a statute authorizes suit in federal courf;366 the
statute must provide more than a permissible inference of con-
gressional intent to abrogate. 67 While the courts disagree on
whether Congress actually abrogated state immunity in enacting
IGRA, they agree that it intended to abrogate . 6 Because the
circuits agree that IGRA clearly expresses Congressional intent
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the first step of the two-
step test is satisfied.
B. Congressional Power to Abrogate
To determine if Congress has in fact abrogated state sover-
eignty under the Eleventh Amendment, courts must next decide
whether Congress possessed the power to abrogate in this in-
stance. 69 This question is not as easy as the first because the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether Congress has this
power under the Indian Commerce Clause. The Court has upheld
congressional authority to abrogate when legislating under Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment3 70 and when enacting
laws pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.37
1
Indian tribes argue that Congress also has the power to
abrogate state immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.17 2
Federal courts have considered two arguments, under two ra-
tionales, for whether Congress' power to abrogate extends to
the Indian Commerce Clause. First, the Interstate Commerce
Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause may be equals and
366. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786-87 n.4.; Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246.
367. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230. In Union Gas, the Supreme Court described
a "cascade of plain language" which had expressed intent to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 11.
368. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1428 ("Congress has unmistakably expressed
its intent to subject suits to federal court under IGRA . . . ."); Spokane Tribe,
28 F.3d at 995 ("Congress' intent could not be much clearer."); Seminole
Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1024 ("Congress intended to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity."); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 281 ("[E]xpress provision
for federal jurisdiction over claims under the IGRA is sufficient to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity.").
369. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 558
("However, whether Congress has the power to [abrogate], no matter how
clear it makes its intentions, is another question entirely.").
370. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
371. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
372. Both the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses are found in Article
I, Section Eight of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power "To
regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art I. § 8, cl. 3.
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therefore both give Congress the power to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity. Second, each of the two clauses may have
distinct and separate applications. Thus, Congress may not have
per se power to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause as
it does under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Union Gas is a key case in weighing the two alternatives. A
restrictive interpretation of Union Gas suggests that the Indian
Commerce Clause is not the equal of the Interstate Commerce
Clause. A milder reading leads to the opposite conclusion. Thus,
courts have turned to the Supreme Court's decisions in Fitzpa-
trick, Blatchford, and Cotton Petroleum, to help determine
whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.
1. Minority View - No Power to Abrogate
The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit to hold Congress
powerless to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause. From
the outset, the court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida37 1 framed its
rejection of IGRA abrogation in terms of surrender theory. If
Congress possessed plenary power to abrogate state immunity
under the Indian Commerce Clause, or any other constitutional
provisions for that matter, the court believed that the power
must have been a consequence of a state surrender of its
immunity to suit or a result of state consent. 374 The court's
exclusive concern with surrender of state immunity left not a
prayer that the court would find that Congress possessed power
to abrogate.
In Seminole Tribe, Indian tribes sued Florida and Alabama
to compel compact negotiations under IGRA.375 The court de-
termined that immunity would exist unless the court found any
of three types of consent - express consent, consent through
participation in a federal program, a la Parden, or by implied
consent resulting from state surrender of immunity in the "plan
of convention.' '376
373. 11 F.3d 1016 (l1th Cir. 1994).
374. Id. at 1021-22.
375. Id. at 1020-21.
376. Id. at 1021-22, 1023. The Eleventh Circuit also considered whether
suits could be brought by Indian tribes to enforce IGRA under the legal
fiction of Ex Parte Young that permits federal injunction to force a state
officer to comply with federal law, in this case the governors of Florida and
Alabama. It rejected the fiction, finding that suits against state governors to
compel them to negotiate IGRA compacts were essentially suits against the
states, and that to permit such suits one of the types of state consent to sue
must exist. Id. at 1028-29.
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The court quickly disposed of express consent because neither
Florida nor Alabama had consented in their constitutions, sta-
tutes, or judicial decisions. 77 The court gave slightly more
attention to consent under the Parden doctrine.3 78 Invoking
Parden, the tribes argued that because the states have attempted
to benefit from IGRA then they should be held to have con-
sented to the downside of the legislation - federal jurisdiction
over IGRA suits. The Eleventh Circuit found Parden inappli-
cable because of its distinguishable facts and because Parden's
doctrine of consent by conduct is virtually dead law.379
The Eleventh Circuit declared that Blatchford governed its
resolution of whether, under the plan of convention, states
surrendered their sovereign immunity to suits from Indian tribes
as they had for suits by states.38 0 The court assumed that the
"plan of convention" theory expressed in Blatchford was based
on the principle of waiver rather than abrogation. The court
declared that because Blatchford found no mutuality of conces-
sion between the states and the tribes, the states could not be
said to have surrendered their immunity to the tribes under the
plan of convention.3"'
377. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1022.
378. Id. at 1022-23.
379. Id. The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that Parden was the "first -
and, to date last - time" that the Supreme Court found that a state had
waived its immunity to suit by participating in a federal program. Id. at 1022.
The court noted that Parden was decided largely by its facts, and those facts
involved the unique instance where a state had entered into a "private" activity
regulated by the federal government. Id. at 1023. The court found that state-
tribal compact negotiations were hardly a private activity, and thus differed
both factually and in principle from Parden. Id.
380. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1022.
381. Id. The district court in the litigation which the circuit court reversed
had belittled reliance upon plan of convention theory for determining the
existence of congressional power to abrogate. Seminole Tribe v. Florida 801
F. Supp. 655, 662 (S.D. Fla. 1992). It regarded plenary congressional power
to abrogate as the central thrust of Union Gas. Id. at 660-61 n.6. The district
court called the "plan of convention" surrender of sovereignty a "waiver"
argument more than a "abrogation" argument, and maintained that in the
Indian affairs context this was rejected by the Supreme Court in Blatchford.
Id. The district court spumed the conclusion it saw in Spokane Tribe and
Sault Ste. Marie that the Supreme Court in Blatchford determined that
Congress lacked the power to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause.
Id. at 663 n.10. The Seminole Tribe court contended that Blatchford should
be regarded as a "waiver" case and its concerns over the absence of mutuality
of concession between the tribes and states should be limited to that context.
Id. at 663. The court added that even if the waiver principles expressed in
Blatchford were relevant to the question of Congressional abrogation power,
they were not important in determining the extent of abrogation power under
the Indian Commerce Clause. Id.https://ope scholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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After dispensing with consent, the Seminole Tribe court
considered Congress' power to abrogate under the Indian Com-
merce Clause. The court noted that the Supreme Court had
only found that Congress possessed the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause.382 The tribes
attempted to fit IGRA within one of Congress' established
abrogation powers."" The court, however, rejected the tribes'
arguments that IGRA was enacted pursuant to both Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate Com-
merce Clause.38 4 Seminole Tribe found it implausible that IGRA
was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Interstate Commerce Clause and readily discarded this claim.3 85
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that IGRA was enacted "solely
under the Indian Commerce Clause. 386
The court declined to expand Union Gas to find that Con-
gress had power abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause.
The court began its analysis by characterizing Union Gas as
weak authority because it was a "badly fractured" plurality
decision. 3 7 The Court also concluded that Union Gas was not
applicable for two reasons. The court first asserted that a "fair
reading" of the Supreme Court decision was that it was in-
tended only to apply to the Interstate Commerce Clause.388 The
court concluded that the Union Gas opinion was not framed
in terms of the Commerce Clause as a whole to include both
382. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1023.
383. Id. at 1025-26.
384. Id. at 1025.
385. Id. at 1025-1026. The tribes contended that Fitzpatrick's holding that
Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating pur-
suant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to granting Congress
authority to abrogate state immunity in IGRA. Id. at 1025. The justification
offered for this contention was that IGRA implicated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because the law creates both a liberty interest and property interest for
Indian tribes under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1992). 11 F.3d
at 1025. The Eleventh Circuit determined that IGRA created no Roth-type
property or liberty interests and thus the tribes could not rely on Fitzpatrick.
Id. The tribes also tried to fit IGRA within Union Gas by arguing that
Congress passed IGRA pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause with the
goal of shielding Indian gaming from the influence of organized crime and
other corrupting influences. Id. Portraying organized crime as a burden to
interstate commerce, the tribes argued that because Congress sought to legislate
in this area, that IGRA was enacted pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Id. at 1025-26. The court disagreed, stating that congressional concern
about organized crime was not directed at relieving a burden on interstate
commerce but at protecting Indian tribes. Id. at 1026.
386. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1026.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1027.
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the Interstate and Indian Clauses. The court felt that Union
Gas confirmed the two clauses' uniquely different qualities and
purposes. 389 The court noted that while Cotton Petroleum was
not controlling because it dealt with completely different issues,
the decision shed light on the differences between the clauses. 39°
The court's second reason for not extending Union Gas was
somewhat odd. The court revived Parden3 91 to illustrate that
Congress lacked the authority to abrogate under the Indian
Commerce Clause. 392 The court stated that Union Gas "pri-
marily relied" upon Parden and that both cases were concerned
with applying federal law to states engaging in functions which
typically involve private parties.393 In contrast, the court found
that states functioned in their ordinary governmental roles in
negotiating compacts with Indian tribes under IGRA. Thus,
the court concluded that even if Union Gas could be extended
to justify "congressional abrogation power under the Indian
Commerce Clause in general," such power did not exist when
Congress legislated in an area typically reserved to the states,
such as negotiating compacts with Indian tribes. 394
2. Majority View - Power to Abrogate.
Three circuits have held that Congress has the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity to suit under the Indian
Commerce Clause. The decisions of the Tenth Circuit in Ponca
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma395 and the Ninth Circuit in
389. Id.
390. Id. (quoting Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192) ("[T]he Interstate
Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause have different applica-
tions."). The Eleventh Circuit noted that Cotton Petroleum described the
Interstate Commerce Clause as conferring upon Congress plenary power to
limit state activity in order to maintain free trade among the states. Id. In
contrast, the court noted, the Supreme Court believed that the central function
of the Indian Commerce Clause was to provide Congress with plenary power
to legislate in the field of Indian affairs. Id.
391. The court took the Parden decision as dead law for the purpose of
holding that the state had not by their conduct consented to an IGRA lawsuit.
Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1023.
392. Id. at 1028.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994). The Tenth Circuit also held that the
Tenth Amendment and the Ex Parte Young doctrine did not bar IGRA suits.
Id. at 1432-37.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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Spokane Tribe v. Washington396 provide detailed reasoning for
their holdings and thus are discussed in this section. 397
Ponca Tribe and Spokane Tribe are firmly grounded on
plenary power theory. Both courts had no reluctance to treat
Union Gas as based on plenary power reasoning and to extend
that reasoning to the Indian Commerce Clause. 39 The Ninth
Circuit in Spokane Tribe viewed Fitzpatrick and Union Gas as
recognizing that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it relies on a constitutional provi-
sion which gives the legislative branch "plenary power over
matters affecting the states." 319 This was not surrender or waiver
theory but clear abrogation doctrine. The Tenth Circuit in Ponca
Tribe expressed the doctrine as permitting Congress to "remove"
the constraint of the Eleventh Amendment when Congress leg-
islates "pursuant to certain constitutional provisions bestowing
plenary powers on Congress."
The Ponca Tribe and Spokane Tribe courts were undaunted
by the fact that Union Gas was a plurality opinion. Both courts
found that despite the difference between the reasoning of the
Union Gas plurality and the concurrence the opinions agreed
on the narrow grounds that Congress held power to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to the
Interstate Commerce Clause."°1
Both Ponca Tribe and Spokane Tribe recognized that the
Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick and Union Gas held that Congress
possessed plenary power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
when legislating pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment4 and the Interstate Commerce Clause. 4 3 Therefore,
in order to conclude that Congress had the power to abrogate
under the Indian Commerce Clause, these courts had to find
396. 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994).
397. The decision the of the Eighth Circuit in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993), receives only slight treatment
here because it provides almost no reasoning for its holding, except to explicitly
to adopt the conclusion (and perhaps implicitly the reasoning) of the district
court in the Seminole Tribe, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 665
(S.D. Fla. 1992), litigation that had extended Union Gas to apply to the
Indian Commerce Clause and found that Congress had the plenary power to
abrogate under IGRA. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in part also seems to be
based on express consent. 3 F.3d at 280. After perfunctorily concluding that
IGRA precluded Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Eighth Circuit, seemingly
to bolster this conclusion, mentioned that by actively engaging in compact
negotiations the states had accepted the benefits of the Indian gaming law.
Id. at 281. But see Seminole Tribe, I1 F.3d at 1020.
398. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1430; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 996.
399. Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 995.
400. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1429 (emphasis added).
401. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1430; Spokane Tribe 28 F.3d at 996, 997.
402. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1429; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 995.
403. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1429; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 995.
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that at least the same degree of plenary power was contained
in that clause as in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate
Commerce Clause. This was no problem for the two circuits.
The Tenth Circuit stated, "[W]e perceive no constitutional dis-
tinction between the plenary powers bestowed in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Indian
Commerce Clause. "44 The Ninth Circuit likewise, referring to
plenary power as the basis for abrogation, found the analysis
developed by the Supreme Court in Union Gas and Fitzpatrick
to be equally applicable to the Indian Commerce Clause .40
Plenary power was plenary power to these courts.
Neither court found Cotton Petroleum authority to distinguish
between the plenary power bestowed by the Interstate Commerce
Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause. Both courts, in fact,
cited Cotton Petroleum as authority to find plenary power in
the Indian Commerce Clause and thus congressional abrogation
authority. Ponca Tribe pointed out that the different appli-
cations of the two commerce clauses was not what was signifi-
cant.4 What was significant to the Court was the fact that
both clauses were based on plenary power and meant to allow
the federal government to limit state authority. 40 8
The Eleventh Circuit in Seminole Tribe had regarded the
Supreme Court's doctrine of mutuality of concession as stated
in Blatchford as controlling. Ponca Tribe and Spokane Tribe
found Blatchford irrelevant and unimportant. 410 In Spokane
Tribe, the court noted that Blatchford's holding that a general
waiver of immunity by the states from tribal suits cannot be
inferred from the Constitution did not resolve the more pertinent
question of whether Congress had plenary power to abrogate
under the Indian Commerce Clause .4 1 In other words, as Ponca
Tribe noted, the Supreme Court decision was concerned with
waiver of immunity from suit between the states and tribes, not
with Congress's ability to abrogate state immunity when exer-
cising its plenary power to act on behalf of the Indians.412
403. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1429; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 995.
404. 37 F.3d at 1430.
405. Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 996.
406. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1430; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 995.
407. 37 F.3d at 1431.
408. Id.
409. 11 F.3d at 1022.
410. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1431; Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 995.
411. 28 F.3d at 995.
412. 37 F.3d at 1431.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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Twenty-two states are in the Eighth, 4 3 Ninth, 41 4 and Tenth415
Circuits, which have held that IGRA abrogates state sovereign
immunity from suit by tribes to enforce the compact provision
of the statute. Three states are within the Eleventh Circuit,41 6
which permits states to repel these suits with the Eleventh
Amendment defense. Moreover, federal district courts in two
other states in other circuits have held that state sovereign
immunity bars IGRA suits. 4 7 Whether or not IGRA's compact
provision is enforceable against state sovereign immunity is an
open question in the twenty-three states encompassed in federal
circuits that have not resolved the issue. In sum, the enforcea-
bility of the IGRA compact provision is at an impasse.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Gaming is a success for those tribes which have undertaken
it,41 although with the proliferation of gaming competition
around the country there is no guarantee that this success will
be universal and lasting. At the moment gaming enterprises are
truly a "new buffalo" for many tribes. 4 9 The states' failure to
413. The Eighth Circuit consists of South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska,
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, and Arkansas.
414. The Ninth Circuit consists of Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon,
Idaho, Washington, Montana, Alaska, and Hawaii.
415. The Tenth Circuit includes Oklahoma, Kansas, New Mexico, Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming.
416. The Eleventh Circuit includes Florida, Georgia, and Alabama.
417. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.
Mich. 1992); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Mississippi, No. CIV.A
J90-0386(B), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19397 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 1991).
418. Myron Ellis, Chairman of the Minnesota Indian Gaming Association,
described the beneficial impact for Indians of gaming in his state which had
been fostered by IGRA:
As Indian gaming enterprises have begun to thrive, the economic
deserts of the reservations have begun to bloom. Subsidiary and
support businesses, like motels and hotels, cafes, transportation
companies, and food and beverage supply companies, - both on
an [sic] off the reservations - have found new life in this time
of recession and more jobs were saved or created.
Tribes have used their revenues to fund their government op-
erations and to develop and support tribal educational, social, and
community development efforts in a time of declining Federal
funding. Some tribes are using their revenues to diversity their
economic base and to fund individual member economic enter-
prises. Wasn't this what [IGRA] was all supposed to be about?
Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Hearings Before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 214 (Feb.
5, 1992) (statement of Myron Ellis, Chairman of the Minnesota Indian Gaming
Association).
419. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text (explaining that gambling
provides Indians with the hope of economic self-sufficiency).
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live up to the compact obligation is crippling, if not killing, this
new source of economic sustenance for Indians.
Public policy, on the one hand, and proper constitutional
interpretation, on the other, are the two dimensions which come
into play when considering state use of the Eleventh Amendment
defense to avoid IGRA compacting with Indian tribes or to gain
better negotiating leverage in such compacts. States are effec-
tively sabotaging the compact provisions by invoking the Elev-
enth Amendment, to assert that tribes have no remedy and
Congress has no authority to subject them to the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 420
As a matter of public policy, the most apt words to describe
state behavior are "betrayal" and "bad faith." The states'
behavior in IGRA compacting should certainly be no surprise,
for it has long characterized state relations with Indian tribes.
Indians initially opposed IGRA's requirement of compacts as
an unwarranted grant of state authority over Indian gaming and
an infringement of tribal sovereignty. Nevertheless, Indian tribes
have honorably played by the rules established by Congress,
despite serious reservations. In contrast, the states have not
played by the rules for which they themselves lobbied. Now,
the states claim that IGRA cannot be enforced against them.
This is like giving Indians blankets in the summer, and asking
for their return in winter.
The better legal argument is on the side of the Indians, not
the states, on the Eleventh Amendment issue. First, Congress
clearly stated that IGRA was meant to benefit the Indians. 421
Congress enacted IGRA in light of the Supreme Court's long
adopted tenet that when federal legislation is meant to benefit
Indians, any collision between state and Indian sovereignty is
to be resolved in favor of the Indians.422 The majority view of
the federal courts appears to follow this fundamental tenet but
some courts either ignore or misunderstand it.
420. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (explaining that states
are undoing Indian gaming).
421. IGRA is primarily designed to benefit Indian tribes by allowing them
to develop gaming ". . . as a means of promoting economic development,
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government." 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
422. "The Committee ... trusts that courts will interpret any ambiguities
on these issues in a manner that will be most favorable to tribal interests
consistent with the legal standard used by courts for over 150 years in cases
involving Indian tribes." S. Rep. No. 446, supra note 3, at 15. The Committee
noted that IGRA recognized and intended to ". . . preserve the principles
which have guided the evolution of Federal-Indian law for over 150 years."
Id. at 5. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (stating that
disputes between tribal and state authority are subject to the "eminently sound
and vital canon that [federal] statutes passed for the benefit of dependent
Indian tribes ... are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being
resolved in favor of the Indians.") (citations omitted).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
IGRA AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The Continental Congress intensely debated the respective
roles of the states and the federal government in relations with
Indian tribes and in the Articles of Confederation accepted a
compromise splitting jurisdiction between them. 423 This arrange-
ment was completely unworkable and a source of friction be-
tween the states and federal government during the period of
confederation. 424 The clear and direct language of the Article I
Indian Commerce Clause that "[t]he Congress shall have power
... to regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes" was
meant by the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to disown and
eliminate the proviso reserving state authority over Indian affairs
under the Articles of Confederation. 42 James Madison explained
that the Indian Commerce Clause was intended to erase any
misunderstanding as to the sharing of powers by the states and
central government in Indian affairs. 426 The framers of the
Constitution drafted the Indian Commerce Clause to eliminate
state power to regulate Indian affairs and to place the matter
squarely in the hands of the federal government. 427 Congressional
power over Indian affairs was to be exclusive and plenary.
The Supreme Court decision in Union Gas is the principal
reference in the dispute among federal courts determining whether
the Indian Commerce Clause allows Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity by enacting IGRA. 428 The court ruling in
favor of the states regarded Union Gas as resting on surrender
423. Article IX, clause 4 of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the
sole and exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade
and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any
of the states, provided that the legislative right of any state within
its own limits be not infringed or violated.
Id. (emphasis added). As a result of this provision, during the period of
confederation the reach of national government power over Indian affairs and
the limitation on it which arose out of reserving states' rights was a matter
which generated considerable confusion and debate, and "these limitations
rendered federal power of no practical value." Dick v. United States, 208
U.S. 340, 356 (1908).
424. Robert N. Clinton & Maragert T. Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of
the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the
Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REv. 17, 23 (1979).
425. Id. at 29.
426. James Madison noted that, as a result of the Constitution, referring
apparently to the Commerce Clause, that "The regulation of commerce with
the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles
of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory."
THE FEDERALiST No. 42, 284 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
427. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985)
("With the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive
province of federal law.").
428. See supra part VII.
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theory, reasoning that it must be shown that the "plan of
convention" meant the states to consent to abrogation of their
sovereignty when Congress legislated pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause.429 Putting aside for the moment the plenary
power theory that congressional power over Indian affairs is
complete and exclusive and erases state authority, this view fails
to see that surrender theory itself cuts the other way to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.
While the part of the Commerce Clause at issue in Union Gas
is clearly the interstate portion, the Court did not differentiate
it from the Indian commerce provision which occupies the same
sentence. Not distinguishing between the interstate 6r Indian
parts, Union Gas unequivocally states that when the Commerce
Clause was enacted the states fully consented to congressional
authority to regulate commerce and thereby in aggregate relin-
quished their immunity. The Supreme Court made very clear
that state consent was uniform, immediate, irreversible, and not
subject to case-by-case exceptions. 4 0 It is hard to imagine that
permanent state immunity was surrendered in the Interstate
Commerce Clause and not in the Indian Commerce Clause
because both are in the same sentence.
The view that Union Gas is inapplicable because it does not
apply to federal legislation adopted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause is without merit. At a minimum, both the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause
are commensurate, and thus even under surrender theory, IGRA
is not unenforceable under the Eleventh Amendment. But in a
perverse way, the federal courts siding with the states are correct
in regarding the two sections of the Commerce Clause as not
being equals. For when the plenary power theory is entered in
the equation, it becomes clear congressional power under the
Indian Commerce Clause is greater than under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, states
share power to regulate non-Indian commerce within their bor-
ders with Congress. However, because congressional power to
regulate Indian commerce is plenary, the states share no au-
thority with Congress unless Congress allows this to occur.
429. See supra part VII.B.1.
430.... [T]o the extent that the States gave Congress the authority
to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where
Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render
them liable. The States held liable under such a congressional
enactment are thus not "unconsenting"; they gave their consent
all at once, in ratifying the Constitution containing the Commerce
Clause, rather than on a case-by-case basis.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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Moreover, the crux of the Supreme Court's decision in Ca-
bazon is that the states have no inherent power to regulate
Indian gaming in particular because they lack power over Indian
affairs in general.43' As a result of Cabazon, the states would
have had no say in Indian gaming had Congress not enacted
IGRA. In devising compacting, Congress extended the oppor-
tunity and privilege to the states to have a voice in Indian
gaming. Congress need not have shared its power in this way
with the states. It stands to reason that Congress likewise can
choose to subject the states to suit in federal courts for mis-
treating this privilege.
The split in the federal courts over the constitutional enforce-
ability of the compact provision has created an impasse for
Indian gaming. There are two ways this impasse can be resolved
in order to allow Indian gaming to proceed as Congress wished.
One is a definitive resolution by United States Supreme Court,
directly striking down the Eleventh Amendment defense to IGRA.
The other solution, congressional action, seems unlikely to cure
the problem anytime soon.
Two of the principal architects of IGRA, Senators Daniel
Inouye, a Democrat from Hawaii, and John McCain, a Repub-
lican from Arizona, have been upset by the states' failure to
fulfill their obligations to compact and their use of the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendment defenses to achieve this result. On
June 16, 1992, the Senators, who were the majority and minority
chairs, respectively on the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, wrote the nation's governors and insisted they deal
fairly with the Indians or face amendments to IGRA leaving
the states out of the Indian gaming process eniirely. 432 The
governors ignored this warning and continued to use the Elev-
enth Amendment impede compacting. 43 3 Indian tribes have urged
Congress to amend IGRA to allow Indian gambling with federal
approval, rather than state compacts, if the states continue using
their constitutional defenses. 434
Indian allies in Congress have introduced several bills to
bypass the states if they raise constitutional objections or oth-
erwise impede compacting. 35 Unfortunately for the Indians,
431. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215.
432. Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Native American Af-
fairs of the House Committee on Natural Resources, Implementation of Public
Law 100-497, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 348 (Apr. 2, 1993) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings] (position paper of
the National Indian Gaming Association, Tribal Gaming and the Need for
Corrective Legislation to Remove Obstacles to Compacting).
433. Id.
434. Id. at 342.
435. See H.R. 1028, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (allowing a tribe to apply
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states also have their allies in Congress who have been intro-
ducing amendments to IGRA to bolster state ability to resist or
refuse compacts and subordinate Indian law to state law for
gaming. 4 6 The contradictory legislative proposals from both
sides have prevented a legislative solution to the stalemate.
The National Indian Gaming Commission has authorized at
least 75 tribal-state compacts around the nation. 4 7 So it is
apparent that tribal gaming is proceeding forward to some
degree. In some instances where states have failed to complete
negotiations the tribes have taken matters in their own hand
and proceeded with Class III gaming without approved com-
pacts. The National Indian Gaming Commission reported that
at the end of 1992 at least 33 Class III tribal gaming establish-
ments had taken this action. 4 Most of the Indian nations,
however, seek to have IGRA "work as it was intended to
to the National Indian Gaming Commission for a Class III certificate if a
state fails to consent to federal court jurisdiction or raises a defense against
such jurisdiction); H.R. 6158, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (allowing states
the option to enter into Class III compact negotiations and allowing tribes to
seek National Indian Gaming Commission certification for Class III gaming
if a state fails to consent to jurisdiction or a federal court finds it lacks
jurisdiction to enforce compact provision); H.R. 2788, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1988) (providing additional time to conduct state/tribal compact negotiations).
436. See S. 1035, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (shifting burden of proof
from a state to the United States in a compact negotiation action initiated by
the United States on behalf of a tribe); H.R. 2323, 103d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1993) (limiting Class III gaming to those kinds of gaming expressly specified
by state law); H.R. 2287, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (placing a moratorium
on Tribal-State gaming compacts); H.R. 1953, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(barring any type of Class III gaming on Indian lands unless specifically
allowed by the state); H.R. 1953, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (limiting Class
III gaming to those activities expressly authorized by state law); H.R. 1261,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (prohibiting any type of Class III gaming on
Indian lands unless specifically allowed by the state); H.R. 6172, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992) (excluding from evidence that a state has not negotiated a
compact in good faith a state's demand that negotiations gaming activities
contemplated a compact with a tribe be conduced on the same basis as those
conducted by any other person or entity under state law); H.R. 1670, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (requiring the agreement of any state located within
45 miles of the proposed location of any gaming activity on newly acquired
Indian land before such activity may be conducted).
437. Oversight Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Native American Af-
fairs of the House Committee on Natural Resources on Implementation of
Public Law 100-497, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Serial No.
103-17, Part III, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (June 25, 1993) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearings] (statement of James Bilbray, Congressman from Nevada).
438. Oversight Hearings, supra note 437, at 12 (June 25, 1993) (statement
of Rep. Bilbray, inserting into record U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENEAL, SURvEY REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT, No. 93-1-349 (Dec. 1992)).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/3
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work. '439 Until the compact controversy is definitely resolved
by Congress or the Supreme Court, the Indians' "New Buffalo"
will remain hobbled.
439. Oversight Hearings, supra note 437, at 341 (Apr. 2, 1993) (statement
of John Kieffer, Vice-Chairman, Spokane Tribe of Indians).
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